Thomas Reid Argument or from epistemic Judgment
This is one of my favorite God arguments and its my origonal.
Argument:
(1) we trust perceptions that work for us in navigating the world
(2) we juge by criteria "Regular.consistant, shared" *(RCS)
(3) Reliious Experience fits this criteria
(4 )enables navigation
(5) :. we are warranted to trust RE as indicative
*We assume reality by means of a Jugement
*we make such jugements based upon criteria
*Because RE fits the same criteria we are justfied in making the same assumption; ie that these experinces are idicative of a reality.
The criteria: If our experiences are:
*Regular
*consistant
*inter=subjective ("shared")
*navigational
Then we assume our eperience3s reflect reality.
VIII. The Thomas Reid Argument.
A. How do we Know the external world exists?
Philosophers have often expressed skepticism about the external world, the existence of other minds, and even one's own existence. Rene Descartes went so far as to build an elaborate system of rationalism to demonstrate the existence of the external world, beginning with his famous cogito, "I think, therefore, I am." Of course, he didn't really doubt his own existence. The point was to show the method of rationalism at work. Nevertheless, this basic point, that of epistemology (how we know what we know) has always plagued philosophy. It seems no one has ever really given an adequate account. But the important point here is not so much what philosophers have said but what most people do. The way we approach life on a daily basis the assumptions we make about the external world. Skeptics are fond of saying that it is irrational to believe things without proof. I would argue that they, an all of us, believe the most crucial and most basic things without any proof whosoever, and we live based upon those assumptions which are gleaned with no proof of their veracity at all!
B. Consider Thomas Reid's Common Sense Philosophy of Foundatinalism and Fallibalism.
The point of departure here is Reid's discussion of Hume and the problem of justification of the external world. This is discussed in lecture notes of a contemporary philosopher, G.J. Mattey, in his lecture notes.
1) Skepticism about the External World
Thomas Reid, Theory of Knowledge lecture notes.G.J. Mattey
Philosophy, UC Davis
"Consider the question whether we are justified in believing that a physical world exists. As David Hume pointed out, the skepticism generated by philosophical arguments is contrary to our natural inclination to believe that there are physical objects." "[T]he skeptic . . . must assent to the principle concerning the existence of body, tho' he cannot pretend by any arguments of philosophy to maintain its veracity. Nature has not left this to his choice, and has doubtless esteem'd it an affair of too great importance to be trusted to our uncertain reasonings and speculations. We may well ask, What causes induce us to believe in the existence of body?, but 'tis in vain to ask, Whether there be body or not? That is a point, which we must take for granted in all our reasoning." (A Treatise of Human Nature, Book I, Part IV, Section II) "Nonetheless, after considering the causes of our belief in the existence of body and finding them inadequate for the justification of that belief, Hume admitted to be drawn away form his orignal assumption that bodies exist. 'To be ingenuous, I feel myself at present . . . more inclin'd to repose no faith at all in my senses, or rather imagination, than to place in it such an implicit confidence,' because ''tis impossible upon any system to defend either our understanding or senses." His solution to these doubts was "carelessness and in-attention,' which divert the mind from skeptical arguments."
2) Reid's Defense of Commonsense Beliefs.
Mattey again:
"Thomas Reid, who was a later contemporary of Hume's, claimed that our beliefs in the external world are justified.'I shall take it for granted that the evidence of sense, when the proper circumstances concur, is good evidence, and a just ground of belief' (Essay on the Intellectual Powers of Man, Essay IV, Chapter XX). This evidence is different from that of reasoning from premises to a conclusion, however."
"That the evidence of sense is of a different kind, needs little proof. No man seeks a reason for believing what he sees or feels; and, if he did, it would be difficult to find one. But, though he can give no reason for believing his senses, his belief remains as firm as if it were grounded on demonstration. Many eminent philosophers, thinking it unreasonable to believe when the could not shew a reason, have laboured to furnish us with reasons for believing our senses; but their reasons are very insufficient, and will not bear examination. Other philosophers have shewn very clearly the fallacy of these reasons, and have, as they imagine, discovered invincible reasons agains this belief; but they have never been able either to shake it themselves or to convince others. The statesman continues to plod, the soldier to fight, and the merchant to export and ijmport, without being in the least moved by the demonstations that have been offered of the non-existence of those things about which they are so seriously employed. And a man may as soon by reasoning, pull the moon out of her orbit, as destroy the belief of the objects of sense." (Essay on the Intellectual Powers of Man, Essay IV, Chapter XX)
"Here Reid shows himself to have foundationalist tendencies, in the sense that our beliefs about physical objects are not justified by appeal to other beliefs. On the other hand, all he has established at this point is what Hume had already observed, that beliefs about physical objects are very hard to shake off. Hume himself admitted only to lose his faith in the senses when he was deeply immersed in skeptical reflections. But why should Reid think these deeply-held beliefs are based on "good evidence" or "a just ground?" One particularly telling observation is that a philosopher's "knowledge of what really exists, or did exist, comes by another channel [than reason], which is open to those who cannot reason. He is led to it in the dark, and knows not how he came by it" (Essay on the Intellectual Powers of Man, Essay IV, Chapter XX). Philosophers "cannot account for" this knowledge and must humbly accept it s a gift of heaven."
"If there is no philosophical account of justification of beliefs about the physical world, how could Reid claim that they are justified at all? The answer is the way in which they support common sense."
"Such original and natural judgments [based on sense-experience] are, therefore, a part of that furniture which Nature hath given to the human understanding. They are the inspiration of the Almighty, no less than our notions or simple apprehensions. They serve to direct us in the common affairs of life, where our reasoning faculty would leave us in the dark. They are part of our constitution; and all the discoveries of our reason are grounded upon them. They make up what is called the common sense of mankind; and, what is manifestly contrary to any of those first principles, is what we call absurd. (An Inquiry into the Human Mind, Chapter VII, Section 4)"
"One might say that judgments from sense-experience they are justified insofar as they justify other beliefs we have, or perhaps because they are the output of a perceptual system designed by God to convey the truth. (Of course, if the latter is what gives these beliefs their justification, the claim that we are designed in this way needs to be justified as well.)" C. In other words, We accept the existence of the external world as a matter of course merely because we perceive it.
1) Acceptance of Perceptions about the world.
But it is not merely because we percieve it that we accept it. It is because we perceive it in a particular sort of way. Because we perceive it in a regular and consistent way. This has been stated above by Reid. The common man goes on with his lot never giving a second thought to the fact that he can no more prove the veracity of the things around him than he can the existence of God or anything else in philosophy. Yet we accept it, as does the skeptic demanding his data, while we live out our lives making these assumptions all the time.
Argument:
(1) we trust perceptions that work for us in navigating the world
(2) we juge by criteria "Regular.consistant, shared" *(RCS)
(3) Reliious Experience fits this criteria
(4 )enables navigation
(5) :. we are warranted to trust RE as indicative
*We assume reality by means of a Jugement
*we make such jugements based upon criteria
*Because RE fits the same criteria we are justfied in making the same assumption; ie that these experinces are idicative of a reality.
The criteria: If our experiences are:
*Regular
*consistant
*inter=subjective ("shared")
*navigational
Then we assume our eperience3s reflect reality.
VIII. The Thomas Reid Argument.
A. How do we Know the external world exists?
Philosophers have often expressed skepticism about the external world, the existence of other minds, and even one's own existence. Rene Descartes went so far as to build an elaborate system of rationalism to demonstrate the existence of the external world, beginning with his famous cogito, "I think, therefore, I am." Of course, he didn't really doubt his own existence. The point was to show the method of rationalism at work. Nevertheless, this basic point, that of epistemology (how we know what we know) has always plagued philosophy. It seems no one has ever really given an adequate account. But the important point here is not so much what philosophers have said but what most people do. The way we approach life on a daily basis the assumptions we make about the external world. Skeptics are fond of saying that it is irrational to believe things without proof. I would argue that they, an all of us, believe the most crucial and most basic things without any proof whosoever, and we live based upon those assumptions which are gleaned with no proof of their veracity at all!
B. Consider Thomas Reid's Common Sense Philosophy of Foundatinalism and Fallibalism.
The point of departure here is Reid's discussion of Hume and the problem of justification of the external world. This is discussed in lecture notes of a contemporary philosopher, G.J. Mattey, in his lecture notes.
1) Skepticism about the External World
Thomas Reid, Theory of Knowledge lecture notes.G.J. Mattey
Philosophy, UC Davis
"Consider the question whether we are justified in believing that a physical world exists. As David Hume pointed out, the skepticism generated by philosophical arguments is contrary to our natural inclination to believe that there are physical objects." "[T]he skeptic . . . must assent to the principle concerning the existence of body, tho' he cannot pretend by any arguments of philosophy to maintain its veracity. Nature has not left this to his choice, and has doubtless esteem'd it an affair of too great importance to be trusted to our uncertain reasonings and speculations. We may well ask, What causes induce us to believe in the existence of body?, but 'tis in vain to ask, Whether there be body or not? That is a point, which we must take for granted in all our reasoning." (A Treatise of Human Nature, Book I, Part IV, Section II) "Nonetheless, after considering the causes of our belief in the existence of body and finding them inadequate for the justification of that belief, Hume admitted to be drawn away form his orignal assumption that bodies exist. 'To be ingenuous, I feel myself at present . . . more inclin'd to repose no faith at all in my senses, or rather imagination, than to place in it such an implicit confidence,' because ''tis impossible upon any system to defend either our understanding or senses." His solution to these doubts was "carelessness and in-attention,' which divert the mind from skeptical arguments."
2) Reid's Defense of Commonsense Beliefs.
Mattey again:
"Thomas Reid, who was a later contemporary of Hume's, claimed that our beliefs in the external world are justified.'I shall take it for granted that the evidence of sense, when the proper circumstances concur, is good evidence, and a just ground of belief' (Essay on the Intellectual Powers of Man, Essay IV, Chapter XX). This evidence is different from that of reasoning from premises to a conclusion, however."
"That the evidence of sense is of a different kind, needs little proof. No man seeks a reason for believing what he sees or feels; and, if he did, it would be difficult to find one. But, though he can give no reason for believing his senses, his belief remains as firm as if it were grounded on demonstration. Many eminent philosophers, thinking it unreasonable to believe when the could not shew a reason, have laboured to furnish us with reasons for believing our senses; but their reasons are very insufficient, and will not bear examination. Other philosophers have shewn very clearly the fallacy of these reasons, and have, as they imagine, discovered invincible reasons agains this belief; but they have never been able either to shake it themselves or to convince others. The statesman continues to plod, the soldier to fight, and the merchant to export and ijmport, without being in the least moved by the demonstations that have been offered of the non-existence of those things about which they are so seriously employed. And a man may as soon by reasoning, pull the moon out of her orbit, as destroy the belief of the objects of sense." (Essay on the Intellectual Powers of Man, Essay IV, Chapter XX)
"Here Reid shows himself to have foundationalist tendencies, in the sense that our beliefs about physical objects are not justified by appeal to other beliefs. On the other hand, all he has established at this point is what Hume had already observed, that beliefs about physical objects are very hard to shake off. Hume himself admitted only to lose his faith in the senses when he was deeply immersed in skeptical reflections. But why should Reid think these deeply-held beliefs are based on "good evidence" or "a just ground?" One particularly telling observation is that a philosopher's "knowledge of what really exists, or did exist, comes by another channel [than reason], which is open to those who cannot reason. He is led to it in the dark, and knows not how he came by it" (Essay on the Intellectual Powers of Man, Essay IV, Chapter XX). Philosophers "cannot account for" this knowledge and must humbly accept it s a gift of heaven."
"If there is no philosophical account of justification of beliefs about the physical world, how could Reid claim that they are justified at all? The answer is the way in which they support common sense."
"Such original and natural judgments [based on sense-experience] are, therefore, a part of that furniture which Nature hath given to the human understanding. They are the inspiration of the Almighty, no less than our notions or simple apprehensions. They serve to direct us in the common affairs of life, where our reasoning faculty would leave us in the dark. They are part of our constitution; and all the discoveries of our reason are grounded upon them. They make up what is called the common sense of mankind; and, what is manifestly contrary to any of those first principles, is what we call absurd. (An Inquiry into the Human Mind, Chapter VII, Section 4)"
"One might say that judgments from sense-experience they are justified insofar as they justify other beliefs we have, or perhaps because they are the output of a perceptual system designed by God to convey the truth. (Of course, if the latter is what gives these beliefs their justification, the claim that we are designed in this way needs to be justified as well.)" C. In other words, We accept the existence of the external world as a matter of course merely because we perceive it.
1) Acceptance of Perceptions about the world.
But it is not merely because we percieve it that we accept it. It is because we perceive it in a particular sort of way. Because we perceive it in a regular and consistent way. This has been stated above by Reid. The common man goes on with his lot never giving a second thought to the fact that he can no more prove the veracity of the things around him than he can the existence of God or anything else in philosophy. Yet we accept it, as does the skeptic demanding his data, while we live out our lives making these assumptions all the time.
Comments
Let us us start with number (1):
"we trust perceptions that work for us in navigating the world"
What exactly is meant here by "navigating the world"? I know that if I see a chair, I can be confident that there is something physical there I can sit on. If I see a doorway, that is the preferred way out of the room. There are literally thousands of examples we use every day.
This brings us to (2):
"we juge by criteria "Regular.consistant, shared" *(RCS)"
Not sure exactly what you mean here, but the general idea is that when you see a chair you consistently find a chair is actually there. From a very early age we learn to correlate what we see with what is actually there.
And so (3):
"Reliious Experience fits this criteria"
Does it? Is it really true that a religious experience is regular, consistent and certain as the existence of that chair you are sat on right now? I doubt it.
I feel confident saying that you can confirm the existence of the chair by feeling it, as well as seeing it. You could bang it on the floor, and hear it too. It might even have a smell.
Furthermore, your perception of the chair helps you navigate the world in a very clear way; you can use it to find a place to sit.
Exactly how does a religious experience help navigate the world? This is where the vague terms are important, because when it comes to religious experiences navigating the world has quite a different meaning. Rather than helping you to negotiate the physical world, they provide happiness.
I am not suggesting that providing well-being has no value, but I am saying it is of a very different nature to our perception of the chair. Our perception of the chair, how it looks and how it feels, is best explained by their being an actual chair there. That is NOT the case of religious experiences. Another plausible explanation is, for example, that they are caused by chemicals in the brain.
Hypothesis 1: Our perception of the chair is caused by the existence of a real chair
Hypothesis 2: Our perception of the chair is caused by drugs
How do we tell between the two? If the former, we would expect to be able to sit on the chair, we would expect the chair to be consistent in its form and nature. If this is a drug-induced hallucination, we would not expect that.
In the terms of this article, in the former case the real chair is regular and consistent (and shared?), leading us to think it is real.
Hypothesis 1: Religious experiences are caused by God
Hypothesis 2: Religious experiences are caused by mild drugs
How do we tell between these two? I do not think we can, based partly on the fact that people have inducing religious experiences by using drugs for thousands of years. They both help us navigate the world in terms of feeling good, but not in terms of actually negotiating it physically.
I expect you will object that I am wanting to limit "navigating the world" to the physical world, that you will seize upon that as typical narrow atheist thinking. However, it has to be pointed out that your support for "navigating the world" is all limited to the physical world. The Thomas Reid you have named the argument after is concerned purely with that physical world.
If you want to extrapolate to the spirutual, it is encumbent on YOU to show that that is justified.
Pix
As usual, this argument depends on vague and dubious definitions.
Let us us start with number (1):
"we trust perceptions that work for us in navigating the world"
What exactly is meant here by "navigating the world"? I know that if I see a chair, I can be confident that there is something physical there I can sit on. If I see a doorway, that is the preferred way out of the room. There are literally thousands of examples we use every day.
typical atheist obfuscation, try to make difficulties, what do you mean by up? navigating the world is pretty obvious
This brings us to (2):
"we juge by criteria "Regular.consistant, shared" *(RCS)"
Not sure exactly what you mean here, but the general idea is that when you see a chair you consistently find a chair is actually there. From a very early age we learn to correlate what we see with what is actually there.
You could make it a lot more absurd if you tried.
And so (3):
"Reliious Experience fits this criteria"
Does it? Is it really true that a religious experience is regular, consistent and certain as the existence of that chair you are sat on right now? I doubt it.
Yes that's what all those studies show. what my book is about,
I feel confident saying that you can confirm the existence of the chair by feeling it, as well as seeing it. You could bang it on the floor, and hear it too. It might even have a smell.
how does that disprove my argent? it as no impact.
Furthermore, your perception of the chair helps you navigate the world in a very clear way; you can use it to find a place to sit.
Nothing about that contradicts criteria, if the chair changed every time I l looked at it it would not mean any thing to perceive it,
You are full of shit as usual, the point is not that RE helps us navigate, but that it conforms to the same criteria we use to judge valid perceptions.,
I am not suggesting that providing well-being has no value, but I am saying it is of a very different nature to our perception of the chair. Our perception of the chair, how it looks and how it feels, is best explained by their being an actual chair there. That is NOT the case of religious experiences. Another plausible explanation is, for example, that they are caused by chemicals in the brain.
what does that have to do with anything?
you are so full of shit none of the twaddle you spit up has anythig to do with this argument
It simply says we judge true perceptions by this criteria and RE fits that criteria so we should accept it as valid perception. that is not hard to understand. Of course you are trying to distort it with a lot of half baked irrelevant epistemology,
I carefully explained why it is used ambiguously.
Pix: Is it really true that a religious experience is regular, consistent and certain as the existence of that chair you are sat on right now? I doubt it.
Joe: Yes that's what all those studies show. what my book is about,
In what way are they regular? In what way are they consistent? In what way are they certain?
You could have made this clear, if you wanted to. Instead, you merely asserted that they are. Clearly you have chosen NOT to make it clear.
To put it another way, what do you expect from a religious experience? If it is regular and consistent, you should be able to say. I can certainly do that for a chair.
Joe: Nothing about that contradicts criteria, if the chair changed every time I l looked at it it would not mean any thing to perceive it,
If the chair changed every time you look at it, it would not be consistent and regular. That would seem to invalidate the claims of "Regular.consistant, shared".
Joe: You are full of shit as usual, the point is not that RE helps us navigate, but that it conforms to the same criteria we use to judge valid perceptions.,
Number (1) is about navigating the world, number (3) about religious experiences. But of course this is an exercise in obfuscation, so of course religious experiences have nothing to do with navigating the world!
Joe: You are full of shit as usual, the point is not that RE helps us navigate, but that it conforms to the same criteria we use to judge valid perceptions.,
So in what way are they regular? In what way are they consistent? In what way are they certain?
I note again that you could have stated this, and chose not to.
Pix
Joe: typical atheist obfuscation, try to make difficulties, what do you mean by up? navigating the world is pretty obvious
I carefully explained why it is used ambiguously.
No it is not ambiguous at all its obvious
Pix: Is it really true that a religious experience is regular, consistent and certain as the existence of that chair you are sat on right now? I doubt it.
certain is not my criteria you added that of your o, Regular constant and shared, and yes the studies show RE does conform to that criteria
Joe: Yes that's what all those studies show. what my book is about,
In what way a
re they regular? In what way are they consistent? In what way are they certain?
every time I pray I feel Gods presence and it always feels the same, you added certain that is not part of my criteria.
You could have made this clear, if you wanted to. Instead, you merely asserted that they are. Clearly you have chosen NOT to make it clear.
Ut us clear you are trying to muddy it,
To put it another way, what do you expect from a religious experience? If it is regular and consistent, you should be able to say. I can certainly do that for a chair.
Joe: Nothing about that contradicts criteria, if the chair changed every time I l looked at it it would not mean any thing to perceive it,
If the chair changed every time you look at it, it would not be consistent and regular. That would seem to invalidate the claims of "Regular.consistant, shared".
exactly that's what I was saying, That should explain it,
Joe: You are full of shit as usual, the point is not that RE helps us navigate, but that it conforms to the same criteria we use to judge valid perceptions.,
Number (1) is about navigating the world, number (3) about religious experiences. But of course this is an exercise in obfuscation, so of course religious experiences have nothing to do with navigating the world!
you are still tryi8g to ofuscate the meaningI saidquire clearly RE coms to te criteria that's the point of the argument,
Joe: You are full of shit as usual, the point is not that RE helps us navigate, but that it conforms to the same criteria we use to judge valid perceptions.,
PX: So in what way are they regular? In what way are they consistent? In what way are they certain?
I already told you this. Sensing God's presence gives a certain kind of feeling it's always feels that way, Of course you hope we will forget the real third point that is "shared." others experience the same thing. That is a check on reality.
I note again that you could have stated this, and chose not to.
It would not need explaining if not for your obfuscation
Joe: typical atheist obfuscation, try to make difficulties, what do you mean by up? navigating the world is pretty obvious
I carefully explained why it is used ambiguously.
No you carefully distorted the point i made. you seek to divert readers attention away from the point to the issue of how well I made the argument, You changed point 3 from "shaded" to "certain"
Pix: Is it really true that a religious experience is regular, consistent and certain as the existence of that chair you are sat on right now? I doubt it.
Joe: Yes that's what all those studies show. what my book is about,
Except its regular, consistent, and shared, not regular, consistant. and certain,
In what way are they regular? In what way are they consistent? In what way are they certain?
shared, not certain , Certainty is based upon the criteria so it can't be one of the points. Example: when I pray I experience Gods presence it's always the same feeling, regular and consistent. Others experience those feelings in seeming similar ways that's what I call shared,
PX You could have made this clear, if you wanted to. Instead, you merely asserted that they are. Clearly you have chosen NOT to make it clear.
It is clear, you could be reading carefully for understanding rather than looking for ways to obfuscate,
Px To put it another way, what do you expect from a religious experience? If it is regular and consistent, you should be able to say. I can certainly do that for a chair.
I did say it is and I gave an example, God;s presence feels the same way every time,
Joe: Nothing about that contradicts criteria, if the chair changed every time I l looked at it it would not mean any thing to perceive it,
Px" If the chair changed every time you look at it, it would not be consistent and regular. That would seem to invalidate the claims of "Regular.consistant, shared".
Joe: so you really do understand you are just trying to make it difficult,
Number (1) is about navigating the world, number (3) about religious experiences. But of course this is an exercise in obfuscation, so of course religious experiences have nothing to do with navigating the world!
I don't know what you think you are saying
Joe: You are full of shit as usual, the point is not that RE helps us navigate, but that it conforms to the same criteria we use to judge valid perceptions.,
So in what way are they regular?
same particular feelings accompany God;s presence and other phenomena. that is regular and consistent and others feel similar feeling that is :shared." "certain" is your addition,
Given you have stated that you are not claiming religious experiences help with "navigating the world", I admit I was wrong about this.
Joe: every time I pray I feel Gods presence and it always feels the same, you added certain that is not part of my criteria.
For your religious experiences, regular and consistent mean that you have the same emotional response when you think a certain way. I would say that is of a very different nature to how our perception of a chair is regular and consistent.
This is a category mistake; the nature of regular and consistent for a chair is quite different to that of the feeling of God you get.
There are certain things my children have achieved that even now when I think back to them fill me with joy and pride. I guess another example would be a guy thinking of a naked woman, and consequently getting aroused. It is not exactly profound to note that your mind can alter your emotional state, and certainly gives no reason to suppose there must be some outside influence.
Joe: I already told you this. Sensing God's presence gives a certain kind of feeling it's always feels that way, Of course you hope we will forget the real third point that is "shared." others experience the same thing. That is a check on reality.
It is also a common and "shared" experience that when a guy thinks of a naked women he gets sexually aroused. It is part of human nature.
Pix
Joe: No it is not ambiguous at all its obvious
PX: Given you have stated that you are not claiming religious experiences help with "navigating the world", I admit I was wrong about this.
That's cool, thanks
Joe: every time I pray I feel Gods presence and it always feels the same, you added certain that is not part of my criteria.
PX: For your religious experiences, regular and consistent mean that you have the same emotional response when you think a certain way. I would say that is of a very different nature to how our perception of a chair is regular and consistent.
You are basing that on a dogmatic assertion that I can't feel the presence of God since there is no God Thus you are gainsaying the evidence.
PX: This is a category mistake; the nature of regular and consistent for a chair is quite different to that of the feeling of God you get.
That is not a category mistake. Each perception is compared to the criteria and its validity is based upon the criteria, e are not concerned with the object's consistency but with our perception of it.
There are certain things my children have achieved that even now when I think back to them fill me with joy and pride. I guess another example would be a guy thinking of a naked woman, and consequently getting aroused. It is not exactly profound to note that your mind can alter your emotional state, and certainly gives no reason to suppose there must be some outside influence.
I have no idea why you would think that's relevant,
Joe: I already told you this. Sensing God's presence gives a certain kind of feeling it's always feels that way, Of course you hope we will forget the real third point that is "shared." others experience the same thing. That is a check on reality.
It is also a common and "shared" experience that when a guy thinks of a naked women he gets sexually aroused. It is part of human nature.
well yea so how does that disprove my point?
I am saying that you do feel something, but you cannot be sure it comes from God.
If I am to take your word, then your argument is simply:
1. Joe feels God's presence
2. Therefore God exists
The fact that you feel obliged to go through the regular, consistent and shared thing shows you you too know that that is not going to convince.
Joe: That is not a category mistake. Each perception is compared to the criteria and its validity is based upon the criteria, e are not concerned with the object's consistency but with our perception of it.
It is a category mistake. The regularity, consistency and sharedness of our perception of a chair is of a different nature to your personal experience of God. The latter is much more akin to a sense of sexual arousal after thinking about sex.
For one thing, if two people were in the same room as a chair, they would both be perceiving the same chair. That is not the case for the religious experience or for sexual arousal - though both could be triggered by what is perceived in the room, they could as easily be triggered by the internal thoughts of one person, while the other person is totally unaware of it.
If the chair is removed from the room, those two people will stop perceiving it. Thus, our perception of the real world is consistent with it. If we perceive a chair, it is there. If we do not, it is not. That is not the case for religious experiences. They may be consistent in some sense, but not in the same sense as our perception of the chair. Its consistency is of a different nature. Hence, this is a category mistake.
The two people can talk about the chair, and will find that they perceive it the same - same position, same design. When the chair is removed, they can agree that the chair was removed, and likely they can agree on when and how. Thus, or perceptions of the real world are shared. That is not the case for religious experiences. They may be shared in some sense, but not in the same sense as our perception of the chair. Its sharedness is of a different nature. Hence, this is a category mistake.
Pix
Joe: You are basing that on a dogmatic assertion that I can't feel the presence of God since there is no God Thus you are gainsaying the evidence.
PX:I am saying that you do feel something, but you cannot be sure it comes from God.
If I am to take your word, then your argument is simply:
1. Joe feels God's presence
2. Therefore God exists
PX:The fact that you feel obliged to go through the regular, consistent and shared thing shows you you too know that that is not going to convince.
Joe: That is not a category mistake. Each perception is compared to the criteria and its validity is based upon the criteria, e are not concerned with the object's consistency but with our perception of it.
PX:It is a category mistake. The regularity, consistency and sharedness of our perception of a chair is of a different nature to your personal experience of God. The latter is much more akin to a sense of sexual arousal after thinking about sex.
Essentially you are saying that the indusial nature of the perception invalidates it. You are ignoring the intersubjective dimension. The experiences themselves are same. they are not like any other experiences but they are the same the world over among those who have mystical experience.
PX:For one thing, if two people were in the same room as a chair, they would both be perceiving the same chair. That is not the case for the religious experience or for sexual arousal - though both could be triggered by what is perceived in the room, they could as easily be triggered by the internal thoughts of one person, while the other person is totally unaware of it.
The fact of their individual natures would not invalidate the reality nor could it invalidate the epistemic criteria.
PX:If the chair is removed from the room, those two people will stop perceiving it. Thus, our perception of the real world is consistent with it. If we perceive a chair, it is there. If we do not, it is not. That is not the case for religious experiences. They may be consistent in some sense, but not in the same sense as our perception of the chair. Its consistency is of a different nature. Hence, this is a category mistake.
tat does not invalidate it as real especially when the effects of perceiving it are real. Only real causes have real effects,
PX: The two people can talk about the chair, and will find that they perceive it the same - same position, same design. When the chair is removed, they can agree that the chair was removed, and likely they can agree on when and how. Thus, or perceptions of the real world are shared. That is not the case for religious experiences. They may be shared in some sense, but not in the same sense as our perception of the chair. Its sharedness is of a different nature. Hence, this is a category mistaoe
That simply does not invalidate the exercise. We have hundreds of studies that prove the effects of having mystical experiences is good for you, Your argument is merely that visible tangible stimulus are more tryst worthy as existent than are qualia that are not visible or tangible That is true but it does not invalidate the experiences. Neither does it mean that the epistemic criteria can't apply,
I am saying they are of a different nature to our perception of a chair, and are more like a state of sexual arousal. The latter is also intersubjective; they are the same for everyone. But you can become sexually aroused just by thinking about sex. It is just a mental state.
That is a very different thing to perceivingthe chair, which you only do when the chair is present.
Joe: The fact of their individual natures would not invalidate the reality nor could it invalidate the epistemic criteria.
But that is not my point. I am saying religious experiences are of a different nature to our perception of physical objects, and therefore your argument is a category error.
Joe: tat does not invalidate it as real especially when the effects of perceiving it are real. Only real causes have real effects,
That is just nonsense. A guy thinking about sex can cause a real effect, i.e., an erection.
Joe: That simply does not invalidate the exercise. We have hundreds of studies that prove the effects of having mystical experiences is good for you, Your argument is merely that visible tangible stimulus are more tryst worthy as existent than are qualia that are not visible or tangible That is true but it does not invalidate the experiences. Neither does it mean that the epistemic criteria can't apply,
None of which addresses my point that religious experiences are of a different nature to perceiving physical objects.
Joe: That simply does not invalidate the exercise. We have hundreds of studies that prove the effects of having mystical experiences is good for you, Your argument is merely that visible tangible stimulus are more tryst worthy as existent than are qualia that are not visible or tangible That is true but it does not invalidate the experiences. Neither does it mean that the epistemic criteria can't apply,
Are you really saying visible tangible stimulus are NOT more trust worthy as existent than are qualia that are not visible or tangible? Every time you sit on a chair, you are putting faith in your perception that a chair is there; if that faith is misplaced you will end up on the floor. And yet, such is the strength of that faith, that we do not give it a second thought!
Can you give an example of that absolute faith relating to religious experience? And I mean something that actually tests that faith, something where if you had been wrong you would have suffered in some way.
Pix
Joe: Essentially you are saying that the indusial nature of the perception invalidates it. You are ignoring the intersubjective dimension. The experiences themselves are same. they are not like any other experiences but they are the same the world over among those who have mystical experience.
PX: I am saying they are of a different nature to our perception of a chair, and are more like a state of sexual arousal. The latter is also intersubjective; they are the same for everyone. But you can become sexually aroused just by thinking about sex. It is just a mental state.
The fallacy of arguing from analogy, Just because some experience can be made up doesn't mean all forms are. There is a huge difference in getting horny and the sort of life changes brought about by mystical experience. That also misses the boat on what I just said, if it was made up the experiences would all differ because they have no model to go by,
PX;That is a very different thing to perceiving the chair, which you only do when the chair is present.
your chair argument is irrelevant because the same process of epistemic verification is at work either way,
Joe: The fact of their individual natures would not invalidate the reality nor could it invalidate the epistemic criteria.
PX: But that is not my point. I am saying religious experiences are of a different nature to our perception of physical objects, and therefore your argument is a category error.
the epistemic process is the same, The experiences still fit the criteria. That same criteria works for anything we perceive chair or no chair
Joe: that does not invalidate it as real especially when the effects of perceiving it are real. Only real causes have real effects,
PX: That is just nonsense. A guy thinking about sex can cause a real effect, i.e., an erection.
you cannot establish the notion that any defect can be elicited just by imagining it. You cannot prove that you can renovate your life just by imagining it. false analogy to sex proves nothing.
Px:None of which addresses my point that religious experiences are of a different nature to perceiving physical objects.
Get it through your head, WE use the same criteria for all perceptions, it does not matter, so what if it is different?
Joe: That simply does not invalidate the exercise. We have hundreds of studies that prove the effects of having mystical experiences is good for you, Your argument is merely that visible tangible stimulus are more tryst worthy as existent than are qualia that are not visible or tangible That is true but it does not invalidate the experiences. Neither does it mean that the epistemic criteria can't apply,
PX: Are you really saying visible tangible stimulus are NOT more trust worthy as existent than are qualia that are not visible or tangible?
Quote the passage where you think i said that? Where do you see me doing the compassion? I said we do the same criteria for all perceptions,
PX:Every time you sit on a chair, you are putting faith in your perception that a chair is there; if that faith is misplaced you will end up on the floor. And yet, such is the strength of that faith, that we do not give it a second thought!
and that judgment is made based upon regular, constant, and shared, the chair is not changing color, it's not moving, it's the same chair, take it away we all see its gone. Our perceptions of it are regular consistent and shared,
Can you give an example of that absolute faith relating to religious experience? And I mean something that actually tests that faith, something where if you had been wrong you would have suffered in some way.
I don't understand what you want, I think you are misunderstanding the categories I'm working in, What absolute faith?
And there is a huge difference between how we perceive a chair and a mystical experience. But of course you brush that under the carpet because it does not suit your agenda.
I would say it is you committing the fallacy of arguing from analogy. Your argument is based on mystical experiences being analogous to perceiving physical objects. They are not.
Joe: your chair argument is irrelevant because the same process of epistemic verification is at work either way,
So in what way are mystical experiences consistent? In what way are they regular? I asked this early, and you did not reply.
Is it the same way that our perceptions of a chair are regular and consistent?
Joe: you cannot establish the notion that any defect can be elicited just by imagining it.
[I assume "defect" => "effect"]
I think it is pretty well established some effects can be elicited by thought. I am certainly not claiming that that is true of any effect.
Joe: You cannot prove that you can renovate your life just by imagining it. false analogy to sex proves nothing.
And you cannot prove you can renovate your life by perceiving a chair.
Think this through Joe. You are saying mystical experiences are of a different nature to thinking about sex because one gives rise to a renovated life and the other does not. A very clear difference. That same difference applies when we compare mystical experiences and perceiving a chair. If your point here is valid then you have successfully shown that mystical experiences are NOT analogous to how we perceive physical objects.
Joe: Get it through your head, WE use the same criteria for all perceptions, it does not matter, so what if it is different?
So in what way are mystical experiences consistent? In what way are they regular?
Joe: and that judgment is made based upon regular, constant, and shared, the chair is not changing color, it's not moving, it's the same chair, take it away we all see its gone. Our perceptions of it are regular consistent and shared,
Exactly! So in what way are mystical experiences consistent? In what way are they regular?
Joe: I don't understand what you want, I think you are misunderstanding the categories I'm working in, What absolute faith?
With the chair, you put your faith in your perception of it when you sit on it. If your faith is misplaced you will fall to the floor on your backside.
You are saying mystical experiences are analogous, so show me! Give an example of when you have faith in it, sufficient that if your faith was misplaced your would suffer in some way.
Joe: The fallacy of arguing from analogy, Just because some experience can be made up doesn't mean all forms are. There is a huge difference in getting horny and the sort of life changes brought about by mystical experience. That also misses the boat on what I just said, if it was made up the experiences would all differ because they have no model to go by,
And there is a huge difference between how we perceive a chair and a mystical experience. But of course you brush that under the carpet because it does not suit your agenda.
I would say it is you committing the fallacy of arguing from analogy. Your argument is based on mystical experiences being analogous to perceiving physical objects. They are not.
Joe: your chair argument is irrelevant because the same process of epistemic verification is at work either way,
So in what way are mystical experiences consistent? In what way are they regular? I asked this early, and you did not reply.
Is it the same way that our perceptions of a chair are regular and consistent?
Joe: you cannot establish the notion that any defect can be elicited just by imagining it.
[I assume "defect" => "effect"]
I think it is pretty well established some effects can be elicited by thought. I am certainly not claiming that that is true of any effect.
Joe: You cannot prove that you can renovate your life just by imagining it. false analogy to sex proves nothing.
And you cannot prove you can renovate your life by perceiving a chair.
Think this through Joe. You are saying mystical experiences are of a different nature to thinking about sex because one gives rise to a renovated life and the other does not. A very clear difference. That same difference applies when we compare mystical experiences and perceiving a chair. If your point here is valid then you have successfully shown that mystical experiences are NOT analogous to how we perceive physical objects.
Joe: Get it through your head, WE use the same criteria for all perceptions, it does not matter, so what if it is different?
So in what way are mystical experiences consistent? In what way are they regular?
Joe: and that judgment is made based upon regular, constant, and shared, the chair is not changing color, it's not moving, it's the same chair, take it away we all see its gone. Our perceptions of it are regular consistent and shared,
Exactly! So in what way are mystical experiences consistent? In what way are they regular?
Joe: I don't understand what you want, I think you are misunderstanding the categories I'm working in, What absolute faith?
With the chair, you put your faith in your perception of it when you sit on it. If your faith is misplaced you will fall to the floor on your backside.
You are saying mystical experiences are analogous, so show me! Give an example of when you have faith in it, sufficient that if your faith was misplaced your would suffer in some way.
that's your framework not mine. I say we judge experiences by their regularity, consistency and shared nature, RE fit's tat criteria so we can trust it.
mystical experience can be evoked on a regular basis. It is constant recognizable from one person to another as to the kind of experience, and that kind of experiences is had by many people. The experience purports to be that of the divine so we should trust it to be so.
11/13/2020 05:25:00 AM