CADRE Comments

[Note: the contents page for this series can be found here. The previous entry, the fifth for chapter 18, can be found here. ] [This entry concludes chapter 18, "Atheism and the Justification of Non-Justification Ability". It also concludes the fictional dialogue started in chp 17.] (Picking up from the end of the previous part...) Chase (the atheist): ... That doesn't mean I am active! Reed (the theist): No, not necessarily. But by denying it per hypothesis, you leave yourself no possible way to reach even merely probably reliable "perceptions of reality". Your perceptions of probability end up trapped in a formal limbo where no judgments of their relative worth--compared to other estimates of probability for instance--can be legitimately made. Those judgments which might possibly ratify the probability estimates, require active ability to exist on our part. If that ability is proposed not to exist, neither can those judgments effectively exist. Something lik...

[Note: the contents page for this series can be found here. The previous entry, the fourth for chapter 18, can be found here. ] [This entry continues chapter 18, "Atheism and the Justification of Non-Justification Ability". It also continues the fictional dialogue started in chp 17.] (Picking up from the end of the previous part...) Reed (the theist): Let me rephrase the question. Do you perceive yourself to be an alien who has lived a million centuries? Chase (the atheist): Your pitiful sense of humor seems to be reasserting itself... R: I am entirely serious; and I will continue asking the question until I get an answer. C: Fine. No, I do not perceive that I am any such thing. R: Do you have any inclination whatsoever to consider yourself anything other than a human like myself? C: No; and I have never said anything to that effect! I specifically said that this was a fictional example--! R: So mutation and natural selection have also equipped your brain with a consciousn...

[Note: the contents page for this series can be found here. The previous entry, the third for chapter 18, can be found here. ] [This entry continues chapter 18, "Atheism and the Justification of Non-Justification Ability". It also continues the fictional dialogue started in chp 17.] (Picking up from the end of the previous part...) Reed (the theist): I find myself curious to know... excuse me, "desiring to be told"... what types of usage this principle of behavior exhibited itself in, among us humans when we first developed. Chase (the atheist): When we first developed as a species per se, we had the legacy of billions of years of environmental conditioning and mutation from previous species, having honed our inherited instincts to such a pitch, that we were in a position to respond to certain types of stimuli, in such ways that we would consequently behave in fashions most probably suitable to succeed and survive. R: And we call this response today, or our reflect...

[Note: the contents page for this series can be found here. The previous entry, the second for chapter 18, can be found here. ] [This entry continues chapter 18, "Atheism and the Justification of Non-Justification Ability". It also continues the fictional dialogue started in chp 17.] (Picking up from the end of the previous part...) Reed (the theist): You understand, of course, that you've thereby surrendered any claim of accuracy for "atheism" per se. Chase (the atheist): What?! I've done no such thing! Atheism could still be the fact, or characteristic of ultimate reality. R: But that in itself would not have had a necessary effect on how your belief came about. C: As I said, whichever belief ends up as the most successful will very probably have been influenced by the actual state of reality; just as the most successful state of my belief about my bank account, will most probably have been influenced by my efficiency at detecting and responding to my ac...

[Note: the contents page for this series can be found here. The previous entry, the first for chapter 18, can be found here. ] [This entry continues chapter 18, "Atheism and the Justification of Non-Justification Ability". It also continues the fictional dialogue started in chp 17.] (Picking up from the end of the previous part...) Reed (the theist): And this automatic, non-rational rearrangement toward better efficiency could happen to either of us. Chase (the atheist): ... Well... yes. In principle. R: Including the possibility that your "idea" (for want of a better word) about atheism might be rearranged to a "belief" (for want of a better word) in God. C: ...Maybe. I suppose I have to agree that's possible. But I'm confidently willing to take that chance. R: No, you aren't. C: Excuse me? R: No, I won't. We're just automatically reacting here, according to this new proposal of yours. You're not "willing to take that chanc...

[Note: the contents page for this series can be found here. The previous entry, the last for chapter 17, can be found here. ] [This entry starts chapter 18, "Atheism and the Justification of Non-Justification Ability". It continues the fictional dialogue started in chp 17.] (Picking up from the end of the previous part...) Reed (the theist): I repeat: if we stoutly presume that it is possible for us to reason, then that ability must ultimately come from a rational cause. Chase (the atheist): ...sigh. No, not necessarily. We don't have to begin by presuming that it is possible for us to reason. R: What would we begin by doing? C: That's the answer: "we" wouldn't "begin" by "doing" anything. Your argument only works if it is possible for us to reason. R: Are you really sure you want to go this route? C: Just listen! It's true that-- R: True? C: No, forget that. ... Behaviors reflect reality. Yes? R: Seems true. Are you sure you w...

[Note: the contents page for this series can be found here. The previous entry, the third for chapter 17, can be found here. ] [This entry concludes chapter 17.] (Picking up from the end of the previous part...) Reed (the theist): Evidently, we both share some kind of criteria as a fairly reliable clue when we're no longer talking about our human ability in general, but about particular instances of that ability instead. Let us see if we can put our common agreement into play. I claim that Christianity is true; and let us say that I claim this because of automatic knee-jerk reactions to the cultural stimuli that have pummeled my mind since childhood. Any comments? Chase (the atheist): I seem to recall already addressing this example. R: Indeed, you yourself introduced it earlier! What did you say back then? Or what would you say now? Would you say my belief, under these conditions, is rational or non-rational? C: As a rational agent myself, I would judge your belief to be, at bes...

Holding's new book. Defending the Resurrection.   It's an excellent compilation of articles from different independent scholars and laymen, in answer to the Secular Web's Anthology The Empty Tomb. See the Article "Story of Empty Tomb Dated Mid First Century," by Joe Hinman. J.P. Holding ( Tekton Apologetics ) is despised by atheists. They hate him, they go out of their way to heap abuse on him. They say that he is an arch-fundamentalist. Since 90% of the atheists have no idea what a fundamentalist is and don't know the difference, and since atheists slandered me constantly and many have called me a fundie, I figured Holding might not be such a bad guy. Actually I began contacting him and exchanging views year ago, way back in the 90s when I first discovered internet apologetics. I still don't know him very well, but he accepted my article. I was kind of hurt the he didn't ask me to contribute to his anthology on the Jesus Myth since I have so many ar...

[Note: the contents page for this series can be found here. The previous entry, the second for chapter 17, can be found here. ] [This entry continues chapter 17, part 3 of 4.] (Picking up from the end of the previous part...) Reed (the theist): Why should I agree that your evaluation of those clues is rational? Chase (the atheist): What?! That's rather rude! R: Pardon me; let me try a different approach. Would you say you have drawn some reasonable conclusions, about the development of our sentience from non-purposive Nature, from these clues? C: Yes. Would you like some examples? R: No, thank you; it isn't really necessary. C: You aren't even going to look at the examples for yourself!? That seems rather like you're afraid you'll find something that disarms your point! R: It could only disarm my point if the inferences drawn from those clues could possibly be rationally established. C: I assure you, they can. R: Really? Would you mind explaining again why we would...

[Note: the contents page for this series can be found here. The previous entry, beginning chapter 17, can be found here. ] [This entry continues chapter 17, part 2 of 4.] The previous entry ended with: "I will illustrate this formal problem underlying the connection between atheism and human justification attempts, by presenting an imaginary dialogue between Chase (whom I will arbitrarily assign to the atheist role) and Reed (whom I will assign as the theist, using a variation of the theistic Argument from Reason)." (As with all my dialogues, unless I have specifically said otherwise, this one is fictional--I am arguing against myself, in both directions, as an illustration of the application of the principles I have been discussing. I will add parenthetical notes like this on occasion however.) Reed: So, you claim that reality is, at bottom, non-rational. Chase: Yes, I do; in the sense of being "non-sentient". (Note: Chase is not using 'non-rational' to me...