CADRE Comments

      This article is a followup to Cline's argument against religious experience as a God argument. He attacks the concept of mystical experience: "Argument from Mysticism : Can Mystics and Mystical Experiences Prove God's Existence?"By Austin Cline. Cline Begins by establishing the idea of a professional mystic. An important form of the Argument from Religious Experience focuses on the issue of mysticism - it might be called the Argument from Professional Religious Experience. What is claimed is that, throughout time, in various cultures and places, there have existed particular individuals who have somehow had direct, personal experiences with God. Like the general Argument from Religious Experiences, it is claimed that these experiences should be given the same credence as other experiential claims and should not be rejected out of hand. But unlike the general argument, it is observed that mystics spend a lot of time working on understandi...

[Note: the contents page for this series can be found here. The previous entry, Chapter 34, can be found here. ] [This entry constitutes Chapter 35.] I have been considering the third general category of ethical theories: that ethics are something discovered and rational, instead of rational and invented, or irrational and discovered. I covered some weaknesses in those other two general theory types, in order to show how the third category is not only distinct from them but has a unique superiority: the third category, unlike the other two, involves a ground for what we call ‘ethical’ behavior that is in itself inherently ethical in quality. The explanation for ethics, in this category, is really ethical, not really non-ethical, in principle. I will emphasize in principle: if I look more closely at proposed versions of this category and discover that the explanation turns out to be one of the other two categories after all, then at best I can’t say I have identified an actual exampl...

[Note: the contents page for this series can be found here. The previous entry, Chapter 33, can be found here. ] [This entry constitutes Chapter 34.] In my previous chapter, I explained why my argument has now led me to consider questions of interpersonal relationships; what we call 'ethics'. Generally speaking, there are three branches of explanation for 'what happens' when we behave 'ethically'. They are not necessarily mutually exclusive--I myself think all three branches put together account for my own 'ethical' behaviors. But the first two branches are necessarily exclusive of the third branch in this fashion: they essentially deny that truly ethical behavior is taking place. In other words, what those two general theories claim, is that what looks like 'ethical behavior' to us is not actually 'ethical' behavior. In the first theory, we humans invent qualities in order to justify the actions of the individual. (The actions may be...

  Atheists think it is. I've seen many a knock down drag-out fight, multiple threads, lasing for days, accomplishing nothing. I wrote that dilemma off years ago before I was an internet apologist, so long ago I don't remember when. I wrote it off because at an early date I read Boethius who, in his great work The Consolation of Philosophy (circa 524), puts to rest the issue by proving that foreknowledge is not determinism. In this essay I will demonstrate not only that this is true but the atheist error about omniscience and omnipotence contradicting are actually hold overs from the pagan framework which Boethius disproved. ___________________   Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius (480?-524)   Aurthor The Consolation  of Philosophy ___________________ For years my debates on the matter were marked by silly repetition. I would constantly argue that just knowing that someone does something is not controlling it. But atheists were always cock sure that it was. I used th...

In the comments section of one of my recent posts on religious epistemology, atheist David Ellis asks: "Of what does a personal relationship with someone who is invisible, insubstantial, and does not speak back when you speak to him consist? Does a personal relationship with such a God (assuming its real) look one iota different from a personal relationship with an imaginary God who one is firmly convinced is real?" This is a very good question, even though it was made from a standpoint of manifest ignorance of how personal relationships work, with God or anyone else. From the question I infer that Ellis takes the following facts for granted about any 'real' personal relationship: 1) the other person has to be visible, 2) the other person has to be substantial and 3) the other person has to speak back when you speak to him, where presumably speaking is limited to creating differentials in air pressure that are propagated to the ear, where stimulation of the cochlear ...

With this argument I hurl down the gauntlet to John Loftus for formal debate. Overview: Decision Making Paradigm: “the logic of the lamp post" At the heart of all religious belief and all organized religions is experience and the sense of the numinous. This is the foundation of religious belief. If we are going to argue for God it would behoove us to examine the nature of this sense of the numinous. The logic of the lamp post is this: we can't find our keys in the dark. We look under lamp post even if we did not drop them there because that is where we will find them. We can't find God in sense data, because God is not given in sense data. So we look in the place where we will find him, personal experience. Since this is the basis of religious belief it makes sense to look there. Co-determinate: The co-determinate is like the Derridian trace, or like a fingerprint. It's the accompanying sign that is always found with the thing itself. In other words, it’s like trailin...

Introductory note from Jason Pratt: I am here appending in several parts some excerpts from an unpublished book of mine, originally composed late 99/early 2000, wherein I work out a progressive synthetic metaphysic. The current topic is ethical grounding, and an analysis of problems along the three general lines of ethical explanation. The previous entry, which introduced the third general theory of ethics, can be found here. This material continues and concludes chapter 31, "the problem with the third explanation of ethics". Now would be a good time to look over there to the right, and read that disclaimer about how not every post necessarily reflects the beliefs of all Cadre members. In case anyone on my side of the aisle is feeling panicky, I recommend reading the "Heart of Freedom" essay again, since I pretty blatantly spoil the ending of where I'm going there. Until then, I'm going to indulge in a nice solid appreciation of sceptical problems with theis...