The Problem of Evil and Wishful Thinking
I've raised this question in various forms
and forums elsewhere in days past, and thought I would present it again (somewhat
reframed) here and now:
As mentioned in a recent post, a purely good
and powerful God creating a world in which evil temporarily emerges is
illogical only if two or more of the propositions below are logically
incompatible:
1. God is all good
2. God is all powerful
3. Evil exists
But as Alvin Plantinga and others have observed, to derive a contradiction (from an inconsistent set) we would need an additional premise that negates at least one of the others, such as
2. God is all powerful
3. Evil exists
But as Alvin Plantinga and others have observed, to derive a contradiction (from an inconsistent set) we would need an additional premise that negates at least one of the others, such as
4. God is not all good (or, God is somewhat evil), or
5. God is not all powerful (or, God is somewhat weak), or
6. Evil does not exist
5. God is not all powerful (or, God is somewhat weak), or
6. Evil does not exist
In short, the logical problem of evil is a
failure. Whatever evil is, it does not explicitly contradict Christian theism
(and it certainly doesn’t contradict Scripture, which addresses the reality of evil
at length). For atheists and other skeptics determined to argue from evil, that
leaves only some form of the inductive or evidential argument. For them it is the
sheer intensity and degree of apparently pointless suffering that undercuts
Christianity. Life in this world is simply too brutal to be the product of an
omnipotent and benevolent creator.
Yet Christian theology also posits a
comprehensive solution to the problem
of evil, one "built in" to the creation from the beginning. That
solution begins with the work of atonement and subsequent resurrection of
Christ, and culminates in everlasting life in the kingdom of heaven. Surprisingly
enough, many of the same skeptics who endorse the argument from evil tell me
that the promising, hopeful aspects of Christian eschatology are just wishful
thinking, a failure to squarely face the harsh realities of life.
It appears, then, that for many skeptics gratuitous
evil undercuts theism as something God could easily prevent, while promises of excessive,
eternal joy in the kingdom of God are simply unrealistic. But clearly the joys
of heaven are realistic if God exists. And that's just the question before us,
isn't it? We cannot rationally propose Christian faith as a serious hypothesis to
demonstrate its incompatibility with temporary evil in a passing world, but then
refuse to consider its ultimate victory over evil in an eternal heaven because
it's not a serious hypothesis.
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