Showing posts from August, 2015

Should we trade fine tuning for POE?

Alexander Pruss Philosopher at Baylor
on October 8, 2012 10:40 AM|

the prosblogian a philosophy of religion blog 

Admits we can't have a valid piror on theitsic arguements but we can have non numerical reasoning from comparing stength of evidence.

For instance, we might have the judgment that the evidential strength of the Problem of Evil (POE) as an argument against theism is no greater than the evidential strength of the Finetuning Argument (FTA) as an argument for theism. Two thoughts in support of this: (1) the low-entropy initial state of the our universe has been estimated by Penrose to be utterly incredibly unlikely (my paraphrase of his 10^(-10^123)) and some of the other anthropic coincidences come with what are intuitively extremely narrow ranges; the theist has proposed various theodicies--they may not be convincing, but it seems reasonable to say that the probability that together they answer the POE is no less, indeed quite a bit greater, than the incredibl…

50 years of empirical studies offer va scientific empirical basis for belief in God

Ralph Hood Jr. The University 
of Tennessee at Chattanooga

Empirical Supernature

The M scale is very important in my book The Trace of God by Joseph Hinman
please click here, go to my book trailer and watch it so it will move higher up the ladder on You tube, so it will  be seen by more people. Order The Trace of God, by Joseph Hinman on Amazon 

Why should we assume that such experiences are experiences of the divine? The first reason is because the content of the experience is largely that of the divine. Even when the experience is interpreted by the receiver not be about God the receiver has been known to act in way consistently with belief in God, and the experience described is the same experience as those described by those who say ‘this was God.’ Ergo it’s just a matter of interpretation. The vast majority of those who have these experiences do believe they are about God.[1] Secondly, there is a voluminous and ancient tradition of writing ab…

Mind is not Reduceable to Brain Function (3of 3)

Some empirical data supports claim:


There are, however, empirical data that imply that brain is not necessary to mind. One such datum is the humble amoeba. They swim, they find food they learn, they multiply, all without brains or brain cell connections.[26] Various theories are proposed but none really answer the issue. Stuart Mameroff (anesthetist from University of Arizona) and Roger Penrose, Mathematician form Cambridge, raise the theory that small protein structures called microtubules found in cells throughout the body. The problem is they don’t cause any problem with consciousness when damaged.[27] Nevertheless, the amoeba is a mystery in terms of how it works with no brain cells. That leads to the recognition of a larger issue the irreducealbity raises the question of consciousness as a basic property of nature. Like electromagnetism, there was a time when scientists tried to explain that in terms of other known phenomena, when they could …