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Showing posts with the label argument from reason

The Heart of Freedom (2014)

This week, the United States will celebrate our annual Independence Day (July 4th -- the day in 1776 we declared, a bit preemptorily, our independence from Great Britain). Freedom and independence are words with great political and cultural meaning for us; and not only for us, but for the numerous nations who (more-or-less following our lead) also declared their independence from sovereign rulers whom they believed were oppressing them, both socially and not-infrequently religiously. Sad to say, Christianity was just-as-not-infrequently the religious oppression the people were revolting against. To some extent this is even true of the United States: even though our own national revolution was grounded on a mixture of orthodox Christianity and nominal deism (such as Franklin’s and Jefferson’s), the history of our country’s settlement in the centuries before the revolution was typically based on fleeing religious (as well as financial) oppression in Europe. And it can ha...

From A Christian Humanist, To Those Who Worship Humanity's Light

So HúmanLíght has cóme and góne (or stíll perháps is hére), to célebráte "compássion, hópe, and reáson" fór the yeár. The chíldish mÿth and sélf-decéptive fíction hás been húrled, repláced by gládsome trúth of háppy fúture fór our wórld: a fúture buílt by peóple whó exíst as fleéting líghts, snuffed oút at lást and fínallÿ by dúmb amóral níght(s) -- peóple whó in trúth and fáct agaínst that chíldish mÿth are útterlÿ and ónly máde of... whát the héck is thís?! "Compássion, hópe and reáson?" Nó. They thréw that "mÿth" awáy. And yét still wánt to célebráte those thíngs on Chrístmas Dáy, forgétting theír own teáchings thát they wánt to teách at schoól: they woúld have dóne much bétter tó keep Ódin ín their Yúle! A troúblemáking wánderér, whose ónly sácrifíce reveáls a cóming tríumph óf brutálitÿ and íce all reáson ánd compássion, hópe and jóy destróyed at lást and nóthing úp abóve him knóws or cáres of jústice pást. To strúggle éven hó...

How Far Is God Authoritatively Responsible Regarding Sin?

Bill's topic from a few days ago is something that Christians (and other theists of all stripes) have been chewing over for thousands of years. It might seem like the answer is a simple yes or no; but there are concepts which supernaturalistic theists are (in principle) committed to, which introduce difficulties. I spent several hundred pages in Sword to the Heart ( which can be found for free in some different formats, including first here on the Cadre Journal ) slowly and carefully working up those concepts, but I'll summarize them below in a progressing topical order relevant to the question of God's responsibility. ( Click here on the jump to proceed. )

Creation and the Second Person -- the creation of me

[Note: the contents page for this series can be found here. The previous entry, continuing chapter 29, can be found here. ] [This entry concludes chapter 29, "Resolving The Grand Paradox".] You may have noticed I have often insisted throughout my book that opponents are not entirely wrong, but rather they're not entirely right; that they do have some good points, but they're taking them a bit too far or not taking them far enough or putting them together the wrong way. I have recently granted this in the case of pantheists and vitalists, for instance. In the case of atheistic naturalists, I think they are actually on the right trail when they discuss aggregations of natural events as the source of our rationality. Their pivotal error, as I have deduced, is that they put these observations and conclusions into service of a nonsensical proposition: that non-initiation produces initiation ability, that reactions produce actions, that the non-rational can be rational. Th...

Creation and the Second Person -- an argument from personal disparity

[Note: the contents page for this series can be found here. The previous entry, chapter 26, can be found here. ] [This entry begins chapter 27, "My Relationship To Creation And To God".] Let me pause to re-establish a previous point from a slightly different direction, before I continue. If my arguments are to be worth anything, either I must be considered to be capable of thinking; or at least someone must exist who can judge the worth of what seem to me to be my arguments. However, what I call thinking doesn't affect me as if something is knocking into me. True, I can mention some mental behaviors of mine which do behave like this: automatic psychological associations, for instance. But the interesting thing is that I can (and do) form a conceptual, and even a merely perceptual, distinction between the two states. My recognition that some of my mental behaviors happen automatically without truly willed intention on my part implies tacitly that I can distinguish betwe...

Creation and the Second Person -- The Aseity

[Note: the contents page for this series can be found here. The previous entry, the last for chapter 21, and the last for Section Two, can be found here. ] [This entry constitutes Chapter 22, "The Aseity", and starts Section Three, "Creation and the Second Person".] I have discovered (if my argument holds water) that the fundamental ground of all reality is active and sentient, and thus is a Personality. He must, at the barest minimum, be sentient to the degree that I require my own active and sentient properties to be distinctively real. What more He may be, remains to be discovered, if possible. Let me look at a potential problem that many readers will now have. Where did God come from? In one sense, the answer can be deferred; for no matter what philosophy we espouse--atheism or pantheism or theism or anything else--we will fetch up eventually with a reality that just is . (Even if an infinite regression could be possible, it still would finally be an infinite...

Reason and the First Person -- independence and God

[Note: the contents page for this series can be found here. The previous entry, the first for chapter 21, can be found here. ] [This entry continues Chapter 21, "Some Detours".] The form of my argument so far indicates that this entity is the ground of all existences: it (or He, rather) is the Final Fact, or the Independent Fact (the IF). It is no use postulating an intermediate entity for purposes of providing basic action or for grounding my potential reliability at making judgments. An intermediate entity would be a derivative entity, and would (to that degree) be as subject as I am to the properties of the Final Fact. If an ultimately non-sentient, reactive reality either does not provide me with active cognizance, or leaves me with a requirement that I justify my own ability to reliably justify claims; then a proposed intermediate sentience would be in the same boat I am. What I am discovering is that the IF is God, with no backdoor hatches into a qualified atheism. But...

"This Season, Celebrate Reason" Okay, if you insist! {g!}

Yep, doing that already, thanks! {ironic g} Reason, by the way, tells me it isn't a myth. Not in the limited sense of 'fictional' being implied by the atheist group who sponsored the billboard. C. S. Lewis, the famous convert from atheism, the most famous proponent of the Argument form Reason, and arguably the greatest apologist of the 20th century, was very favorably impressed by the mythical characteristics of that story: the myth was as important to him, in his conversion to Christianity, as the history. But anyone putting up that billboard is more interested in rhetoric than reason anyway (billboards not being very conducive to reasoning in the first place, admittedly.) And it should be noted that we Christians put up signs at least as annoying to atheists and others--there's a good chance this is a satiric echo of such advertising or promotion. Still, their ad campaign at Christmas (is this the third year in a row now?) is always amusing, if not always in the way ...

Reason and the First Person -- personhood and God

[Note: the contents page for this series can be found here. The previous entry, chapter 20, can be found here. ] [This entry starts Chapter 21, "Some Detours".] Setting aside (but only for the moment) my concerns about the question of the relations of Independent Action to derivative actions (such as my own), and whether this is an intrinsically contradictory proposition, I continue safely (though a bit shakily) along the path; with the security that there are at least a few situations where what may be called my 'actions' are yet reconcilable with an ultimate Act-er. Thus the proposal of an ultimate Act-er is not yet deducted from the option list; leaving the branch of not-atheisms intact--perhaps with a point in favor of pantheism--as opposed to the branch of atheisms. Very well: if I take seriously the value of my judgments (that value which transcends the question of whether I am correct or incorrect on any given judgment) then I must be able to initiate action--...

Reason and the First Person -- a serious problem with this argument for theism

[Note: the contents page for this series can be found here. The previous entry, the final for chapter 19, can be found here. ] [This entry constitutes Chapter 20. While I'll recap relevant issues below, I definitely recommend being familiar with the case so far. A 25 page summary (from a couple of different directions, including one of supreme importance to me) of the 125 pages of discussion and analysis in this Section, up to now, can be found starting here .] One of the key points to my past few chapters is that philosophies can be broken down into two mutually exclusive categories--atheisms, and not-atheisms--and that if one of those general branches requires a contradiction of the Golden Presumption, then it should be deducted from the option list. Using this strategy, I pared off atheism, leaving the branches of 'not-atheism' for further scrutiny. However, there is a potential problem looming: would the same tactic also deduct not-atheisms from the option list? Does t...

If Only "A Wave Of Reason" Really Would Sweep Across the World

By the way, do popular apologists for atheism have a high opinion of their own reasoning ability? Does the Pope wear a tall hat? {g} Answer: sometimes. When it's convenient. And not, when not. In the video linked above, though, very much triumphantly in favor of human reasoning, especially theirs. (None of the proponents featured in the video are well-known for their responses to theistic arguments from reason, unsurprisingly. Including the formal deductive version I've been discussing here for the past several weeks.)

The Kodachi (Part 5 of 5) -- A Conclusion That Begins

[Note: for Part 4 of this auxiliary series, click here. ] Hey!--where did all that 'true love' stuff go?? It's still around. I believe God exists, because I believe in myself. And because I believe in her , whom I truly love. Whether or not she believes God exists, I still believe in her. Admittedly, I knew this principle long before I met her. But still--you might manage to browbeat me somehow into believing I do not exist. You will never succeed in convincing me that she does not exist!--that she is not a real person; that she does not make her own choices; that I should not treasure those choices, treasure her , for being her and being real. I believe in God, because I refuse to disbelieve in her. Ever. Even if she does not believe in God. The same goes for you, my reader. I am writing this book for you to judge --not for you to knee-jerk react to. I believe in God, because I refuse to disbelieve in you. Even if you do not believe in God. Wait! Am I saying atheists d...

The Kodachi (Part 4 of 5) -- I Am A I

[Note: for Part 3 of this auxiliary series, click here. ] Okay, admittedly, if I go up to an atheist-on-the-street and I ask what her core belief is, as an atheist, she will probably say: "I don't believe God exists". She will probably not say: "I believe the Final Fact is only reactive." Nor is she likely to say this, if I press her on what it means for God to not-exist. What she will probably come down to, sooner or later, is: "I don't believe a Person exists Who made the world or does anything else." If I ask her whether she is a person, however, she will probably say: "Yes." In fact, she is likely to say: "Of course!" If she is being especially reflective, she might say: "I don't know." She will probably not say: "I am not a person"--unless she is devotedly following a metaphysic that teaches her she is not a person. But even philosophers who consider themselves to be nothing in the zero sum, or who...