“I just believe in one fewer god than you do.”

One popular quote relating to atheism is by Stephen Henry Roberts:

“I contend that we are both atheists. I just believe in one fewer god than you do. When you understand why you dismiss all the other possible gods, you will understand why I dismiss yours” - Stephen Henry Roberts

On first hearing, this can seem quite jarring. It is, to his credit, a very well-crafted snippet of language. It shows the importance of how we say things, the language we use, in addition to what we say, the actual content of our assertions. Language captivates us. It takes us on a journey. It can even convince us on its merit alone. However, such conviction, without associated reasonable content, is purely a psychological product of the way the human brain processes such language. If we wish to be reasonable in our beliefs, quality of language alone is not sufficient grounds for believing the truth of a statement. One only needs to dip into any number of excellently-written fantasy novels to confirm this – a well-written statement, no matter how convincing-sounding, is little more than an linguistically pleasing jumble of words if it does not contain truth.

So, therefore, what of the truth content of Roberts’ quote? To examine this, we shall unpack more systematically exactly what this statement is claiming, so that we can take as objective view on it as possible:

1) “I contend that we are both atheists.”

This statement is written to the audience of a theist from an atheist perspective, so this is effectively saying, “I content that both you, the theist, and I, the atheist, are both atheists.” Now, in its present form, this statement seems incoherent. In context, it is trying to say that the theist is an atheist with respect to “other gods”. What does this really mean? The belief in the truth of one concept of God implies a dismissal of other conceptions of God, just as the belief in any truth about anything logically implies a rejection of ideas which contradict this truth. To believe that the moon is made of rock logically excludes the belief that the moon is made of cheese (since cheese is not a form of rock!) To say, therefore, that one is atheist simply because one has defined the nature of one’s belief of God, which implies other conceptions of God are dismissed, is a stretch at best.

To give a crude parallel, let’s imagine Bob absolutely loves chocolate ice-cream. He eats it for dessert every evening. However, he hates vanilla ice-cream. It would be a bit like categorising Bob as an “ice-cream hater” on the basis that he hates vanilla, even though he loves and eats chocolate ice-cream every day! This move, this exaggeration, from the specific to the general is subtle and sounds impressive, yet rationally speaking, does not truly represent Bob’s position well.

Technically, therefore, this is not atheism, as one cannot be legitimately defined as “atheist” unless one does not believe in any conception of God whatsoever. In other words, an atheist believes in exactly zero concepts of God, by definition. Thus, one cannot simultaneously be theist and atheist without a logical contradiction.

If one is being strictly rational about this statement, therefore, this first sentence is not technically logically possible. It thus miscategorises theism, and this is part of its rhetorical power.

2) “I just believe in one fewer god than you do”

This statement is also very memorable and well-crafted. It trivialises the assertions of atheism, implying it is simply a matter of rejecting one more concept of God than the theist does. This sounds convincing as any clearly-defined belief in God logically implies the non-acceptance of beliefs incompatible with this. Then, since there are possibly infinite possible conceptions of “God”, simply “believing in one fewer god” sounds trivial and insignificant. The issue with this characterisation of belief is that the same could be said about any belief about reality.

If I believe that the only object on a given table is a single green apple, it logically implies my non-acceptance of the potentially infinite spectrum of other combinations of objects that could have been on the table, such as a red apple, a pear, or an orange. Then, if someone comes along and says “I believe nothing is on the table. I simply believe in one less object than you,” then, while this is technically true, there is nothing rationally preferable about their position simply because the table is clear! A clear table is also simply one possibility out of the infinite set of possibilities for the way the table could be and holds no inherent rational advantage. Likewise, this statement is made slightly more comprehensible if we use the language of “worldview”. A “worldview” in this case is defined simply as “one’s view on reality” or “the sum of one’s beliefs about reality”. Every human being who has ever lived has had a view on reality, a “worldview”, even if the view is that reality is unknowable or utterly uncertain. The theist has a worldview, which (by definition) includes a belief in God. The atheist has a worldview, which (by definition) does not include a belief in God.

Clarified in this way, the statement becomes, “I just believe in a different worldview than you do.” This could be said by either the atheist or the theist, and the atheist worldview is not somehow preferable simply because it does not contain a belief in God. In the same way, a person’s worldview would not be preferable simply because of a lack of belief in an apple on the table. Having a view that a given object does not exist does not automatically give preference to one’s worldview. The worldviews are both worldviews, in the same position rationally.

3) “When you understand why you dismiss all the other possible gods, you will understand why I dismiss yours”

This part of the statement, first of all, could be interpreted as a little patronising, implying the theist is simply unable to understand the consequences of why people dismiss conceptions of God. It is my personal conviction that one’s belief, or lack thereof, in God, is completely unrelated to one’s intelligence. Very academically able people have taken both perspectives. Of course, it might feel satisfying to ridicule a belief different to one’s own as inferior, but such petty, subjective competitions are notoriously unhelpful to actually discovering objective truth, and verge on an ad hominem fallacy of dismissing the intelligence of the person rather than addressing the content of their beliefs.

Leaving that aside, why does the theist “dismiss all the other possible gods”? In other words, why do they believe in a certain idea of God? There can be a variety of reasons, such as cumulative evidence for a specific attribute of God, or evidence against an alternative conception of God. (See many excellent posts online by others on these very broad topics!) What’s important here is that the possible reasons given, whether or not one finds them convincing, are undeniably extremely numerous. However, this statement simply assumes these reasons are the same as those which can be used to justify an atheist position. While convenient and catchy as a statement, the idea that every single argument is the same is a gross generalisation at best!

For instance, if I believe God loves all human beings (as I do), it implies I believe there is no man or woman God does not love. I thus dismiss a notion of God who does not love all human beings. Why? Because my positive belief in God’s love excludes this other notion. Thus, much of the time we dismiss alternative beliefs due to positive arguments for the position we hold (e.g. God’s love for all humankind), which then become incompatible with alternative beliefs (e.g. the idea that God does not love all). These positive arguments for belief in God are not arguments for atheism, by definition! An argument for the truth of a certain conception of God is an argument for a form of theism, and thus not for atheism. Yet these positive arguments also logically result in the dismissal of notions of God incompatible with the positive evidence.

Thus for this statement to simplistically claim that one’s reasons for dismissing certain beliefs are also arguments for atheism is simply not realistic. The claim specifically implies one’s reason for dismissing other conceptions for God can also be applied to one’s own conception of God. To be fair, this might be the case for some poorly thought-out arguments. Yet, as shown from the example of an argument for God’s universal love, the majority of the time, this simply isn’t the case. However, prima facie this part of the statement sounds plausible, which is its strength, even though it does not work rationally.

At the end of the day, belief here is the same reason why anyone believes in anything – to take an actual view on something implies a dismissal of contradictory views. Let’s say Bob, our ice-cream lover, holds beliefs A, B and C about the nature of reality. His (extremely simple) worldview could be represented crudely symbolically as [A, B, C]. His friend, John, disagrees and believes A is false, but does believe B and C – let belief F be this belief that A is false, and thus his worldview could be represented as [F, B, C]. Both friends hold worldviews, as we all do. Yet John, by believing [F, B, C], has implicitly dismissed Bob’s worldview of [A, B, C] as not being completely true. Bob, vice versa, has implicitly dismissed [F, B, C] as not being completely true by believing [A, B, C]. Neither Bob not John are in a rationally privileged position. Everyone, in order to believe anything, has to implicitly dismiss thousands, millions, even an infinite set of alternative possibilities. Thus, both the theist and the atheist are in the same position of dismissing an infinity of possible realities in order to come to the one they believe is true. Simply putting the word “god” in there to make it sound as though disbelief in God is somehow uniquely rational seems highly misleading.


Stephen Henry Roberts crafted a well-worded quote which has great linguistic elegance. It’s a good one to use if you like to impress audiences in speeches! However, if one wishes to be reasonable and actually analyse the truth content and internal consistency of the quote, it seems to be little more than a rhetorical device, as it holds very little water as an actual rational argument. Thus, it does not seem a legitimate challenge to belief in God – instead, it highlights just how significant wording and language are in effective dialogue.


Joe Hinman said…
Fine article Elliot. Thank you for posting. I think that phrase is symptomatic of the atheist's misunderstanding of the nature of God., They think God is a god one of many, So to disbelieve in god's a be and c one is three times an atheist.

Each individual concept of god is a different subcategory in their minds. They don't understand the reason for monotheism or the reality that God not one of many he's not a god but the basis of all that is.

anyway I appreciate your post.
Don McIntosh said…
Everyone, in order to believe anything, has to implicitly dismiss thousands, millions, even an infinite set of alternative possibilities. Thus, both the theist and the atheist are in the same position of dismissing an infinity of possible realities in order to come to the one they believe is true.

Yes. This is especially clear in light of the "worldviews" you mention. No rational decision-making person is an atheist simpliciter, which explains why most of the atheists I know do not, for example, simply disbelieve that God created the universe and life within it; they also strongly believe that "nature" has created the universe and life within in it in his stead.
Joe Hinman said…
we not born atheists either. We may be born agnostics. there is a school that says belief in God is a genetic trait so that would mean we are not born atheists.
BK said…
The two detectives stood around the body lying supine on the floor. "Well, what'dya think?" the first inquired in a voice coarse from too many cigarettes.

The second, a large, younger broad-shouldered man with jet black hair looked over his notes. "While the crime lab needs to take some samples, I think it's pretty clear that the victim was poisoned. I think we need to bring the business partner in for questioning. He had a strong motive and he was seen in the area within half an hour of the time of the murder."

"I agree," the rumpled older detective muttered. "Ya' better . . . aw, crap. Here comes Dawdins."

A third detective with bright, alert eyes and wispy grey hair entered the room. "Parsons. Anderson," he said, addressing the two detectives by name. "Guess we're done here, eh? Let's call the morgue and let them clean the place up."

Parsons, the older detective, looked at Dawdins incredulously. "Done? What the hell are you talking about? There's been a murder. We have a lot of investigating ta' do if we hope to identify the murderer."

"Nonsense," Dawdins retorted. "The man obviously died accidentally. There's no murderer to be discovered."

"No murderer?" Anderson was now becoming animated, raising his large frame up in a show of intimidation. "How can you so callously proclaim that there's no murderer?"

Dawdins was nonplussed. "Look, do you think that his wife is the murderer?"

"No," said Parsons, "his wife is in Sacramento on business."

"How about his son? Is he the murderer?" Dawdins pressed.

"No," said Parsons, "the son is in the military serving in Korea."

"What about his secretary? Is she the murderer?"

"No," Anderson chimed in, "she can't be the murderer. She has an air-tight alibi."

"There you have it," Parsons concluded. "You ask how I can think there's no murderer. In fact, you don't think any of the other thousand possible people I could name are murderers. So, really, I just think there's one fewer murderer than you do."

Yeah, makes sense to me. I Believe in One Fewer God than You Do
Weekend Fisher said…
Whenever I hear that line ("one fewer god ...") I usually explain that I think the other gods are just so many cases of mistaken identity.

Take care & God bless
Anne / WF
Don McIntosh said…
Mistaken identity. I like that. Of course the argument cuts both ways. So the next time someone accuses me of "denialism" concerning their favorite version of naturalistic evolutionary theory, I will answer, "I just believe in one less theory than you do."

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