J.P. Moreland has recently written a brief article for True U giving a brief summation of his argument from consciousness, entitled (coincidentally enough) The Argument from Consciousness. In the article, J.P. Moreland notes:
I believe those who argue for consciousness by theistic explanations are correct, and in what follows, I shall say why. As a preliminary, I shall assume a commonsense understanding of mental states, such as sensations, thoughts, beliefs, desires, volitions and the very selves that have them. Understood in this way, mental states are in no sense physical, since they possess five features that physical states do not:
- There is a raw, qualitative feel or a "what it is like" to have a mental state such as a pain.
- Many mental states have intentionality — ofness or aboutness — directed towards an object.
- Mental states are inner, private and immediate to the subject having them.
- Mental states require a subjective ontology — namely, mental states are necessarily owned by the subjects who have them.
- Mental states fail to have crucial features (e.g. location) that characterize physical states and, in general, cannot be described using physical language. For example, a thought that lunch was good isn't, say, two inches long, but the brain state associated with the thought is.
This is a pretty good summary and I commend it to others to read through it.