CADRE Comments

So HúmanLíght has cóme and góne (or stíll perháps is hére), to célebráte "compássion, hópe, and reáson" fór the yeár. The chíldish mÿth and sélf-decéptive fíction hás been húrled, repláced by gládsome trúth of háppy fúture fór our wórld: a fúture buílt by peóple whó exíst as fleéting líghts, snuffed oút at lást and fínallÿ by dúmb amóral níght(s) -- peóple whó in trúth and fáct agaínst that chíldish mÿth are útterlÿ and ónly máde of... whát the héck is thís?! "Compássion, hópe and reáson?" Nó. They thréw that "mÿth" awáy. And yét still wánt to célebráte those thíngs on Chrístmas Dáy, forgétting theír own teáchings thát they wánt to teách at schoól: they woúld have dóne much bétter tó keep Ódin ín their Yúle! A troúblemáking wánderér, whose ónly sácrifíce reveáls a cóming tríumph óf brutálitÿ and íce all reáson ánd compássion, hópe and jóy destróyed at lást and nóthing úp abóve him knóws or cáres of jústice pást. To strúggle éven hó...

[Note: the contents page for this series can be found here. The previous entry, Chapter 35, can be found here. ] [This entry starts Chapter 36, "Discovered Rational Secular Ethics?"] To put things bluntly: so far, no good. Each of the three general theories of ethics have been examined, and found wanting. Invented rational ethics; discovered non-rational ethics; discovered rational ethics--none of these turned out to be objectively ethical in the end. Objective realities were certainly connected to each of the theories--although in the case of God the objective reality was posited rather than commonly agreed upon. (Notice that in my recent discussion of theistic ethics, I didn’t try to connect the proposition of God to my previously developed synthetic argument. There is a reason for that; but I will discuss it later.) To a sceptic, this could hardly be considered an advantage!--especially since the result was demonstrably no better than what a sceptic could do with the fi...

[Note: the contents page for this series can be found here. The previous entry, Chapter 34, can be found here. ] [This entry constitutes Chapter 35.] I have been considering the third general category of ethical theories: that ethics are something discovered and rational, instead of rational and invented, or irrational and discovered. I covered some weaknesses in those other two general theory types, in order to show how the third category is not only distinct from them but has a unique superiority: the third category, unlike the other two, involves a ground for what we call ‘ethical’ behavior that is in itself inherently ethical in quality. The explanation for ethics, in this category, is really ethical, not really non-ethical, in principle. I will emphasize in principle: if I look more closely at proposed versions of this category and discover that the explanation turns out to be one of the other two categories after all, then at best I can’t say I have identified an actual exampl...

[Note: the contents page for this series can be found here. The previous entry, Chapter 33, can be found here. ] [This entry constitutes Chapter 34.] In my previous chapter, I explained why my argument has now led me to consider questions of interpersonal relationships; what we call 'ethics'. Generally speaking, there are three branches of explanation for 'what happens' when we behave 'ethically'. They are not necessarily mutually exclusive--I myself think all three branches put together account for my own 'ethical' behaviors. But the first two branches are necessarily exclusive of the third branch in this fashion: they essentially deny that truly ethical behavior is taking place. In other words, what those two general theories claim, is that what looks like 'ethical behavior' to us is not actually 'ethical' behavior. In the first theory, we humans invent qualities in order to justify the actions of the individual. (The actions may be...

Introductory note from Jason Pratt: I am here appending in several parts some excerpts from an unpublished book of mine, originally composed late 99/early 2000, wherein I work out a progressive synthetic metaphysic. The current topic is ethical grounding, and an analysis of problems along the three general lines of ethical explanation. The previous entry, which critiqued an extremely common theistic variant of the third general ethical theory, can be found here. Also, incidentally, I have gone back and updated links in my previous entries, to make it easier for navigation between them. Any entry with a subsequent entry, now features a hyperlink at the bottom leading to the next entry. I plan to include a 'prequel' link to "The Heart of Freedom" at the bottom of each entry, but I haven't gotten around to doing it yet. Hopefully next time! Technically I would here be starting chapter 32, "the solution to the question of ethics"; but as it happens, I'm ...

Introductory note from Jason Pratt: I am here appending in several parts some excerpts from an unpublished book of mine, originally composed late 99/early 2000, wherein I work out a progressive synthetic metaphysic. The current topic is ethical grounding, and an analysis of problems along the three general lines of ethical explanation. The previous entry, which introduced the third general theory of ethics, can be found here. This material continues and concludes chapter 31, "the problem with the third explanation of ethics". Now would be a good time to look over there to the right, and read that disclaimer about how not every post necessarily reflects the beliefs of all Cadre members. In case anyone on my side of the aisle is feeling panicky, I recommend reading the "Heart of Freedom" essay again, since I pretty blatantly spoil the ending of where I'm going there. Until then, I'm going to indulge in a nice solid appreciation of sceptical problems with theis...

Introductory note from Jason Pratt: I am here appending in several parts some excerpts from an unpublished book of mine, originally composed late 99/early 2000, wherein I work out a progressive synthetic metaphysic. The current topic is ethical grounding, and an analysis of problems along the three general lines of ethical explanation. The previous entry, which summarized problems with the first two general theories of ethics, can be found here. This material continues chapter 31, "the problem with the third explanation of ethics". I won't be getting to the actual problem of the third explanation yet, but I will be introducing the third explanation and generally comparing it to the previous two. ....... [excerpt begins here] What I will now concentrate on, is the third general theory. This theory proposes that ethics are, at bottom, objectively 'ethical'. According to this theory, when we behave 'ethically', then (at least some of the time) we are discerni...