Mind and Emergent property
An emergent property is one that stems from factors lower down in the evolutionary process that do not involve the emergent property. The emergent properties emerge from amid a set of properties none of which herald the emergent one. It just springs forth, life from non-life, consciousness from non-conscious, por soir from en soir.
...[E]mergent entities (properties or substances) ‘arise’ out of more fundamental entities and yet are ‘novel’ or ‘irreducible’ with respect to them. (For example, it is sometimes said that consciousness is an emergent property of the brain.) Each of the quoted terms is slippery in its own right, and their specifications yield the varied notions of emergence that we discuss below. There has been renewed interest in emergence within discussions of the behavior of complex systems and debates over the reconcilability of mental causation, intentionality, or consciousness with physicalism.[1]
According to O'connor and Wang emergent properties can't be reduced to the properties from which they spring. If true that means that if consciousness is emergent it's not reducible to brain fuction. Yet every reductionist I've ever argued with uses emergence to explain the rise of consciousness, which they take to be reduciable to brain chemistry. Emergence is also divided into strong and weak. Strong emergence is when the phenomenon is high level and emerges from a low level domain. Strong emergence was evoked by the British emergentists in the 1920s and is featured in most philosophical discussions about emergence. Weak emergence is in respect to low level domain when high level phenomenon emerges from low level domain but truths concerning that phenomenon are unexpected given the principles governing that domain.[2] The more radical consequences stem from strong emergence. As David Chalmers says, if the property could be deduced principle from the properties it emerges from there's no need to evoke new laws. The radical consequences result from the evoking of new laws, resulting from the emergence of properties not deducible in principle. I am avoiding discussions of artificial intelligence or the Chinese room argument (Searl)[3] as they would divert from the argument. I will, however, bring up Searl's argument about AI in order to make a larger point. Searl argues that consciousness is a biological product and computers can't be emergently conscious because they can't produce a biological basis. In answering Searl Paul Almond says:
While it is reasonable to regard consciousness as an emergent property of a physical system there is no profound sense in which it can be said that different people's brains work according to the same kinds of processes and an appropriately programmed computer and a human brain would work according to different processes. Any difference between these situations is just a matter of degree and any argument that we should presume other people conscious because their brains work in basically the same sort of way could also be used to justify presuming an appropriately programmed computer conscious.[4]This may be a fine idea in philosophy, but how would it work in real life? A doctor in a hospital says “I can't deliver this baby because I have no proof that all human reproductive processes are the same.” You could not practice medicine on that basis. Almond also seems to be contradicting himself because he says on the one hand that we can't assume human thought processes work the same, but somehow we can assume that our minds work the same as computers (which would contradict the ideas that they don't all work the same). Why should we assume it's only a matter of degree? It's pretty self evident that there is a qualitative difference. Searl's argument doesn't help us in deciding about consciousness in humans as emergent but Almond's response tells us something about fallacies in human reason. We must assume that there is a likeness in human consciousness or we can't even do medicine and there's no point in doing science. Thus we can draw analogy between human consciousness and order in the cosmos, metaphysical hierarchy. This will become apparent in unfolding of the argument. But emergent properties per se do not destroy the TS argument.
The notion of emergent properties is firmly ensconced in the repertoire of modern scientific acumen. It's an article of faith for all, those who fail to pledge their allegiance to it are to be ridiculed. Actually there's no reason why emergent properties per se can't be embraced along with belief in God. There is no way to establish that God didn't set it up that way, it probably makes more sense to assume he did. Given the law-like regularity of the universe and modern notions of cause and effect, assuming spontaneous emergence with no prior arrangement of mind is just a contradiction to these aspects of nature (regularity and the necessity of causes). So emergent properties without God (the TS or some other prior agent) violate the criteria of best explanation laid down in chapter three [the book I am writing]; the logical consistency criterion. The emergence of mind is one of the most difficult questions. With simple “self organizing” such as snow flakes there's no problem. When reductionists start insisting that consciousness is emergent and reducible to brain chemistry (actually a contradiction, emergence belongs to holism and is the enemy of reductionism, but one finds at popular level these technicalities escape notice) we must take issue. The need for mind in creation is reflected in the hard problem and in the irreducibility of consciousness.
Reductionists, (especially readers of Dawkins) are convinced that brain chemistry explains consciousness but that view has been proved inadequate. The reductionists are doing a bait and switch, switching brain function for consciousness. Those who claim to evoke mystical experience by brain stimulating use no reliable means of measuring religious experience.[5] One of the major arguments, against the reductionist view, is known as “the hard problem.” The hard problem says that there's a texture to consciousness that can't be communicated, much less reduced to physical origins, but is with us all and thus its existence is self evident. That argument is illustrated by Thomas Negal in his famous article “What is it Like to Be a Bat?” [6] We can have all the facts science can provide about bats but that wont tell us what its like to be a bat. Consciousness has an irreduceable dimension that is fundamental to understanding it and yet scientific reductionism can't tell us about it. In fact some can't admit it exists, even though we all know it does. Sean Carroll dismisses the idea saying, “Nagel actually doesn’t spend too much time providing support for this stance, as he wants to take it as understood and move on.” [7] As though we don't know about the personal dimension to consciousness because we are all conscious (or most of us).
Nagel wrote a book way back in 2012,Mind and Cosmos, for which he was raked over the coals by all manner of scientifically inclined critics. Nagel's basic argument is that because there is this dimension of mind (the hard problem—we can't know what it's like to experience consciousness by reducing the concept to empirical data)-- the subtitle of the book says it-- “...the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature is Almost Certainly False.” He did not argue that evolution is wrong but that the reductionist understanding will never unlock the hard problem because they can't admit there's an aspect of the world their methods can't grasp. He says this not just about brain and mind but that “it invades our understanding of the entire cosmos and its history...a true appreciation of the difficulty of the problem must eventually change our conception of the place of the physical sciences in describing the natural order.” [8] He points to the hubris in modern scientific reductionism in thinking we can understand and explain all things, he argues that we don't understand much of the universe at all. He is arguing about what can and cannot in principle be understood by existing methods.[9] He argues that the failure of psychophysical reductionism to produce a theory of everything marks the inability of reductionism to penetrate the mind-body problem. He argues for a mind-like process in nature but he is not arguing for God. He's an atheist. He introduces teleology back into science.
Negal also argues that the connections between the physical and the mental that emergentists think are responsible for consciousness are all higher order. They concern only complex organisms and don't require any fundamental change in the physical conception of the elements that make up those organisms. "An emergent account of the mental is compatible with a physically reductionist account of the biological system in which mind emerges." [10] So emergence doesn't require any change in the 'ground up' conception of what makes up the universe. To be a true explanation, emergence can't just be a set of correspondences between the physical and mental. It must also be systematic, providing principles or laws linking the two. It must tell us why, or at least how, the physical emerges into the mental.
But even with a systematic theory, emergence seems like an unsatisfactory explanation of the mental. That purely physical elements, when arranged in a certain way, and even if systematically accounted for, should result in consciousness seems like magic. That physical things should exhibit, at the macro level, properties and relations not constituted out of the properties and relations of the physical parts making it up seems like magic. In other cases of emergence, we can understand how the micro properties of the parts give rise to the macro properties of the whole. Liquidity emerging from H2O molecules is an example.
Because emergence of the mental remains mysterious, we should seriously consider an explanation of the more fundamental constituents of the universe. This kind of explanation would draw on a general monism which posits that the basic building blocks contain properties that explain not only physical but also mental properties at the macro level. So there's a deeper more comprehensive reality, of which the physical is only one expression. This deeper framework would explain physical and mental as two aspects of this more fundamental reality. The physical would be an explanation of phenomena from the outside, and the mental would explain things from the inside. "Consciousness in this case is not an effect of the brain processes that are its physical conditions: rather, those brain processes are in themselves more than physical, and the incompleteness of the physical description of the world is exemplified by the incompleteness of their (brain processes) purely physical description." [11] Monism or dualism really depends upon how the terms are used, I don't intend to go into that here. I don't necessarily agree with him on monism but I do about the mental as a basic property of nature. Carroll reviews Mind and Cosmos, he justifies the sorry treatment it was given by the followers of new atheism, who paned it without giving it a chance. They basically treated Nagel like he is a young earth creationist (I believe he's an atheist). Carroll's justification:
Back in the dark ages a person with heretical theological beliefs would occasionally be burned at the stake, Nowadays, when a more scientific worldview has triumphed and everyone knows that God doesn’t exist (emphasis mine), the tables have turned, and any slight deviation from scientific/naturalist/atheist/Darwinian doctrine will have you literally tied to a pole and set on fire. Fair is fair. Or, at least, people will write book reviews and blog posts that disagree with you. But I think we all agree that’s just as bad, right?[12]Translation: “this is not about facts, truth , logic, or reason. Obey the priesthood of knowledge and don't think. But hey we are imposing this ideology so the world will be safe for free thought, just remember to stick with the right ideas.” He says "everyone knows God doesn't exist," 90% of the population is excluded from “everyone.” His answer to the hard problem is basically that it's an old idea and David Chalmers likes it. He accuses Negal of using bad reasoning but his only example is a general allusion to “common sense” which he takes for bad logic, and does not bother to document (although I stipulate that he does appeal to that standard several times).. Appeal to common sense is not the best. Philosophers tend to hate it and its easy prey for people who themselves do not understand argument. For example Carroll belabors Nagel's admission that he's not an expert, not part of the priesthood of knowledge. He misses Nagel's rhetorical strategy in emphasizing consciousness, judgment and intuition in an argument about consciousness. We are all experts in being conscious. He also includes principle of sufficient reason, which is an immanently reasonable standard and one many great philosophers accept. Carroll's rejection of that principle is no doubt based upon the fact that he does not have a sufficient reason for ignoring the need for prior cause, necessity, and can't answer the questions raised by those who want real answers. His major reason for his beliefs is that they free him from belief.
In attacking Nagel's position that we need an explanation for physical law. Carroll says “They [people such as Negal] cannot simply be (as others among us are happy to accept). And the only way he can see that happening is if 'mind' and its appearance in the universe are taken as fundamental features of reality, not simply by products of physical evolution.”[13] Believers are actually tortured with all of that unnecessary thinking? And I thought we were benighted. Apparently it's the skeptics who are happy not to ask questions. There's less to being a “free thinker” than I thought. Carroll then contemplates the terrible consequences for human reason if we accepted that consciousness is not purely physical, (as though the mental dimension just isn't there even though we all experience it all the time); “Imagine what it would entail to truly believe that consciousness is not accounted for by physics. It would entail, among other things, that the behavior of ordinary matter would occasionally deviate from that expected on the basis of physics alone.”[14] There's an expectation that it wont deviate? If it's not prescriptive, if there is nothing to make the regularity stick then we should expect deviation however rare. But of course that's one of those things free thinkers should be happy not to question.
What would it entail to truly believe that consciousness is not accounted for by physics? Belief in God? Nowhere does Nagel go near that conclusion, and in calling himself a monist he could be veering away from that conclusion. Nor does he actually say that physics can't account for consciousness, only that I hasn't, and wont as long as it refuses to consider a mental dimension. Apparently even one step in the direction of God is too close. Carroll then says, “Several billion years ago there weren’t conscious creatures here on Earth. It was just atoms and particles, bumping into each other in accordance with the rules of physics and chemistry. Except, if mind is not physical, at some point they swerved away from those laws, since remaining in accordance with them would never have created consciousness.”[15] Come again? There are laws that determine things? They can't be deviated from? If the regularity of nature is only a description of “tendencies” why shouldn't there be deviation? More of that double minded assumption, laws are not prescriptive except when they help us pretend there's no God. “So, at what point does this deviation from purely physical behavior kick in, exactly? It’s the immortal soul vs. the Dirac equation problem.”[16] Nagel never says we have an immortal soul. Where does that come from. It's like he's arguing with someone other than Nagel. By that statement he means that if the process of our brains “isn't simply following the laws of physics” (another implication of mandated physical law) then “you have the duty to explain in exactly what way the electrons in our atoms fail to obey their equations of motion. Is energy conserved in your universe? Is momentum? Is quantum evolution unitary, information-preserving, reversible? Can the teleological effects on quantum field observables be encapsulated in an effective Hamiltonian?”xvii[17]
First of all, Nagel doesn't say anything about the consciousness dimension being opposed to the laws of physics. Neither do I. Who says there is not a conscious dimension to the laws of physics that we don't know about? But that would be like admitting the priesthood of knowledge doesn't know all things. Secondly, the smokescreen of Nagel's inability to answer specific questions is, as smokescreens usually are, a red herring. If it's a dimension we don't know, then of course we don't know. He has no argument to disprove the hard problem, and no means of demonstrating that Nagel's surmises about it are not sound. Carroll's basic argument is “this can't be true because if it was it would mean the priesthood is not all knowing and there might be a God.” In Carroll's world those reasons are as sound and valid as the equations to which he alludes.
The veracity of this charge is summed up in his final paragraph in the phrase: "He [Nagel] advocates overthrowing things that are precisely defined, extremely robust, and impressively well-tested (the known laws of physics, natural selection) on the basis of ideas that are rather vague and much less well-supported (a conviction that consciousness can’t be explained physically, a demand for intelligibility, moral realism).”[18] Nagel doesn't advocate overthrowing anything, nor does he suggest departing from physics or the methods of scientific exploration. He even says that dualism is a wrong choice. All he is really saying is that there's a dimension that we don't know much about and until we start including it in our explanations, our explanations lack something in explanatory power. Carroll's answer to that seems to be “don't question the faith!” If there is a dimension we don't understand and admitting that is of “enormous consequence” then if true the explanation offered by materialism, physicalism, science itself is not the best. That explanation doesn't account for all the data, one of the criterion for best explanation. The TS argument assumes that dimension and since it doesn't overturn the laws of physics, but assumes them, then it is a better explanation.The irreducibility of mind to brain serves two purposes in the argument: (1) it means there is a dimension that physicalism has ignored, thus it cannot be the best explanation, (2) it sets up Nagel's answer that there must be some mind-like process in the universe for which physicalism cannot take account. When I say “physicalism” in this context I mean all the camps such as: materialism, physicalism proper, reductionism, functionalism, scientism. In presenting evidence for irreducibility of mind to brain I am setting up the argument for mind as the best organizing principle. There is actual positive scientific data that mind does not reduce to brain.
sources
[1] Timothy O'Connor, and Hong Yu Wong, "Emergent Properties", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2015 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.),https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/entries/properties-emergent/
[3] Cole, David, "The Chinese Room Argument", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2015 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2015/entries/chinese-room/
[5]Joseph Hinman, The Trace of God: A Rational Warrant for Belief. Colorado Springs: Grand Viaduct Publishing, 2014,
[6] Thomas Nagel, "What is it like to be a bat?", Mortal Questions, Cambridge University Press, 1979, p. 166. pdf: http://organizations.utep.edu/portals/1475/nagel_bat.pdf accessed 9/14/15. Nagel is philosophy professer atv NYU. Ph.D Harvaed 1963, awards: 1996 PEN/Diamonstein-Spielvogel Award for the Art of the Essay.
[7] Sean Carroll, “Mind and Cosmos,” Sean Carroll (blog)(posted August 22, 2013) URL:
http://www.preposterousuniverse.com/blog/2013/08/22/mind-and-cosmos/ accessedd 9/14/15.
[8] Thomas Nagel, Mind and Cosmos:Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature is Almost Certainly False,. Oxfor: Oxford, London: New York University Press, first edition, 2012, 3.
9 Ibgid 4
10 Ibid 55
11 Ibid 57
12 Carroll, “Mind…”op. Cit.
13 Ibid
14 Ibid
15 Ibid
16 Ibid
17 Ibid
18 Ibid
Comments
Sentences like these do more to show your ideological bias than anything else.
Joe: When reductionists start insisting that consciousness is emergent and reducible to brain chemistry (actually a contradiction, emergence belongs to holism and is the enemy of reductionism, but one finds at popular level these technicalities escape notice) we must take issue.
The problem is that your defintion of emergence is exclusively strong emergence (as O'Connor and Wang define it), but yoiu are critisising reductionists who are referring to and weak emergence. When a reductionist say consciousness is emergent they very clearly mean weak emergent, and it is disingenuous to suppose they mean strong emergent, and then to claim a contradiction.
Joe: The hard problem says that there's a texture to consciousness that can't be communicated, much less reduced to physical origins, but is with us all and thus its existence is self evident. That argument is illustrated by Thomas Negal in his famous article “What is it Like to Be a Bat?” [6] We can have all the facts science can provide about bats but that wont tell us what its like to be a bat.
Imagine a world where everyone lives a lone, but can communicate via the internet. I could describe to you my home, but you would not have the experience of actually living there. How much more difficult, then, is it for you to imagine living inside my head? Or then the head of a bat, using echolocation to sense the world?
There is something unique about consciousness, and that is that consciousness is where we think about these things. I can visit your house, I can drive your car, etc., but consciousness is the ultimate non-sharable. That is what makes it unique.
And that is so, whether we have souls, or strong emergent consciousness or weak emergent consciousness.
It therefore follows that our inability to share that experience is not an indicator of us having souls or of strong emergent consciousness.
Joe: That purely physical elements, when arranged in a certain way, and even if systematically accounted for, should result in consciousness seems like magic.
To me it is quite the opposite. It is a pure physical explanation that, in contrast to other explanations, does not invoke any mysticism.
Joe4: Who says there is not a conscious dimension to the laws of physics that we don't know about?
The fact that science knows so much about how the universe works with that is very good evidence it does not exist.
If these is a conscious dimension to the laws of physics, then it must be the case that is influences and is influenced by the other laws. This is necessarily true because our conscious mind is influenced by what we see, hear, feel, by drugs in our blood, and we can interact with the physical world.
And yet, this has never been detected. This is what opponents to Nagel are alluding to when they say "He [Nagel] advocates overthrowing things that are precisely defined, extremely robust, and impressively well-tested (the known laws of physics, natural selection) on the basis of ideas that are rather vague and much less well-supported (a conviction that consciousness can’t be explained physically, a demand for intelligibility, moral realism).”
Joe: Nagel doesn't advocate overthrowing anything...
Yes he does. You cannot just add a new fundamental force (or whatever) and expect the rest of the laws of nature to be unaffected.
Pix
Joe: The notion of emergent properties is firmly ensconced in the repertoire of modern scientific acumen. It's an article of faith for all, those who fail to pledge their allegiance to it are to be ridiculed.
PX:Sentences like these do more to show your ideological bias than anything else.
Nonsense. Most discussions of EmProps's in philosophy deal with strong sense so it';s not my ideology but my reading matter that's reflected here; I know that has a bearing on my ideology but there's more involved.
Joe: When reductionists start insisting that consciousness is emergent and reducible to brain chemistry (actually a contradiction, emergence belongs to holism and is the enemy of reductionism, but one finds at popular level these technicalities escape notice) we must take issue.
PX:The problem is that your defintion of emergence is exclusively strong emergence (as O'Connor and Wang define it), but you are critisising reductionists who are referring to and weak emergence. When a reductionist say consciousness is emergent they very clearly mean weak emergent, and it is disingenuous to suppose they mean strong emergent, and then to claim a contradiction.
Obvious answer, those are't the one's seeing to reduce consciousness to brain chemistry, Those guys are the strong sense then to is they to whom I speak.
bit BTW your distinction between storg ad weak EPs does;t contradict y basic argument about EP refuting reductionism, even the weak sense coems from holism,
Joe: The hard problem says that there's a texture to consciousness that can't be communicated, much less reduced to physical origins, but is with us all and thus its existence is self evident. That argument is illustrated by Thomas Negal in his famous article “What is it Like to Be a Bat?” [6] We can have all the facts science can provide about bats but that wont tell us what its like to be a bat.
PX:Imagine a world where everyone lives a lone, but can communicate via the internet. I could describe to you my home, but you would not have the experience of actually living there. How much more difficult, then, is it for you to imagine living inside my head? Or then the head of a bat, using echolocation to sense the world?
That sort of like reinforces my point you know. In fact that is my point so I don't understand why you are saying it,
PX:There is something unique about consciousness, and that is that consciousness is where we think about these things. I can visit your house, I can drive your car, etc., but consciousness is the ultimate non-sharable. That is what makes it unique.
And that is so, whether we have souls, or strong emergent consciousness or weak emergent consciousness.
It therefore follows that our inability to share that experience is not an indicator of us having souls or of strong emergent consciousness.
you are making a classical mistake thinking that I am seeking to prove the soul. I associate the part of human being that lives on after death with consciousness. But that doesn't mean that my attempts to refute reductionists are an attempt to prove that part of us survives death. I assume that is merely part of the package of Christian faith, I don't need to prove it.Some atheists think the rductionism disproves notions like the soul or the spirit, so I enjoy refuting that by disproving their notions of reduction.
PX:To me it is quite the opposite. It is a pure physical explanation that, in contrast to other explanations, does not invoke any mysticism.
There is an explanatory gap, you should read Chalmers. This is the point of philosophical zombies, There is no basic reason why we should be conscious, it's not accounted for involution at all. We could do everything we do outwit being conscious and nature would be none the wiser and evolution would be satisfied. There is no reason why evolution should produce conscious beings.
Joe: Who says there is not a conscious dimension to the laws of physics that we don't know about?
PX:The fact that science knows so much about how the universe works with that is very good evidence it does not exist.
Which leaves consciousness completely unaccounted for. Even if such a thing exists how would you know there's no way science could discover it. A big explanatory gap
If these is a conscious dimension to the laws of physics, then it must be the case that is influences and is influenced by the other laws. This is necessarily true because our conscious mind is influenced by what we see, hear, feel, by drugs in our blood, and we can interact with the physical world.
And yet, this has never been detected. This is what opponents to Nagel are alluding to when they say "He [Nagel] advocates overthrowing things that are precisely defined, extremely robust, and impressively well-tested (the known laws of physics, natural selection) on the basis of ideas that are rather vague and much less well-supported (a conviction that consciousness can’t be explained physically, a demand for intelligibility, moral realism).”
you dom;t get iot
*(1) consciousness exists but you just proved it should not exist. It's un accounted for,k explaatory gap,
(2)there are some pretty big reasons to assume consciousness at the transcendental level: such as fine tuning of universal constants,Phenomenology, the nature of the universe when we account for it by reason. The use of reason.
(3)Joe: Nagel doesn't advocate overthrowing anything...
PX:Yes he does. You cannot just add a new fundamental force (or whatever) and expect the rest of the laws of nature to be unaffected.
That's because the standard procedure of reduction is is to saw off from reality whatever it can't control or explain away by it's reductive methods. Thus they procure hegemony,the problem is it leaves this huge explanatory gap that can't be answered,like the hard problem.
Your paradigm is full anomalies and it can only work at the price of it's explanatory power which you only pretend it has.
bit BTW your distinction between storg ad weak EPs does;t contradict y basic argument about EP refuting reductionism, even the weak sense coems from holism,
Can you explain how weak emergence refutes reductionism? Do you mean that we cannot explain viscosity of water if we reduce down to a single molecule of water and we need to consider the whole system, which is the holistic approach? If so, then I think science would agree.
Joe: you are making a classical mistake thinking that I am seeking to prove the soul. I associate the part of human being that lives on after death with consciousness. But that doesn't mean that my attempts to refute reductionists are an attempt to prove that part of us survives death. I assume that is merely part of the package of Christian faith, I don't need to prove it.Some atheists think the rductionism disproves notions like the soul or the spirit, so I enjoy refuting that by disproving their notions of reduction.
I think you are refuting a straw man version of reductionism. No one thinks you can predict emergent properties from a consideration of a single component. However, weak emergent properties can be determined, even if they are surprising, when considering the whole.
I see no reason to suppose that that is not the case with consciousness, and nothing you have presented changes that.
Joe: There is an explanatory gap, you should read Chalmers. This is the point of philosophical zombies, There is no basic reason why we should be conscious, it's not accounted for involution at all. We could do everything we do outwit being conscious and nature would be none the wiser and evolution would be satisfied. There is no reason why evolution should produce conscious beings.
The gap is very specific to one domain. If there really was a new fundamental law that covered consiousness, then there would be anomalies all over physics. That is not the case, and so it is extremely unlikely that there is a fundamental law waiting to be discovered.
The more likely scenario is something unexpected within the existing laws.
I.e., weak emergence.
Joe: Which leaves consciousness completely unaccounted for. Even if such a thing exists how would you know there's no way science could discover it. A big explanatory gap
On the contrary, if such a thing exists, it must follow that science could discover it. It MUST impact on the physical world, because we know consciousness can react to what is in the physical, and can modify the physical.
Joe: *(1) consciousness exists but you just proved it should not exist. It's un accounted for,k explaatory gap,
I just proved it does not require a new law to explain it. Weak emergence is perfectly consistent with what I am saying.
Joe: (2)there are some pretty big reasons to assume consciousness at the transcendental level: such as fine tuning of universal constants,Phenomenology, the nature of the universe when we account for it by reason. The use of reason.
Do please explain what you mean by these.
Pix
Reductionism is a useful approach to a problem, but science is not restricted to it. And yes, science has gaps. A great example would be the intersection of relativity and QM at the Big Bang. Relativity and QM are well established in their domain, but current science cannot fit them together. I guess that is your hegemony. However, we know that whatever unifies them must reduce to relativity in one set of situations and must reduce to QM in another, so we already have some idea of what is missing - and it does not involve consciousness.
Joe: Your paradigm is full anomalies and it can only work at the price of it's explanatory power which you only pretend it has.
Look around you, Joe. All that technology is a direct result of my paradigm and its ability to explain. It has gaps, but they are at the fringes.
Pix
Joe: Obvious answer, those are't the one's seeing to reduce consciousness to brain chemistry, Those guys are the strong sense then to is they to whom I speak.
bit BTW your distinction between storg ad weak EPs does;t contradict y basic argument about EP refuting reductionism, even the weak sense coems from holism,
PX:Can you explain how weak emergence refutes reductionism? Do you mean that we cannot explain viscosity of water if we reduce down to a single molecule of water and we need to consider the whole system, which is the holistic approach? If so, then I think science would agree.
I don't think holoism argues that no form of reductive method is right. For example, top down causation does not mean not bottom up causation it does allow for it within the framework of top down.As I said above if weak emergence does;t argue for rededicate mind to brai funtiom then I'm mot arguing about it.
from my essay: "Yet every reductionist I've ever argued with uses emergence to explain the rise of consciousness, which they take to be reduciable to brain chemistry. Emergence is also divided into strong and weak. Strong emergence is when the phenomenon is high level and emerges from a low level domain. Strong emergence was evoked by the British emergentists in the 1920s and is featured in most philosophical discussions about emergence. Weak emergence is in respect to low level domain when high level phenomenon emerges from low level domain but truths concerning that phenomenon are unexpected given the principles governing that domain.[2] [David Chalmers, “Strinmg and Weak emergence,” Research School of Social Sciences, Austrailian National University, online resource, PDF URL: http://consc.net/papers/emergence.pdf (accessed 3?18/18)]"
Joe: "you are making a classical mistake thinking that I am seeking to prove the soul. I associate the part of human being that lives on after death with consciousness. But that doesn't mean that my attempts to refute reductionists are an attempt to prove that part of us survives death. I assume that is merely part of the package of Christian faith, I don't need to prove it.Some atheists think the rductionism disproves notions like the soul or the spirit, so I enjoy refuting that by disproving their notions of reduction."
PX:I think you are refuting a straw man version of reductionism. No one thinks you can predict emergent properties from a consideration of a single component. However, weak emergent properties can be determined, even if they are surprising, when considering the whole.
There are clearly reductionist such as Daniel Dennett who think that consciousness is a side effect of some structure and can be explained away by understanding that structure,I can point to several discussions I've had with atheists where they both accept this view and explain consciousness as "emergent," refitting them is not a straw man because they do say this,they just happen to be wrong. Does Dennette explicit consciousness as emergent? I don't know if so he's wrong,
PX:I see no reason to suppose that that is not the case with consciousness, and nothing you have presented changes that.
that what is not the case? sounds like you are trying to sneak reductionist in through the back door,
I will Finnish answering latter,don't post anything until I do please.
PX:The gap is very specific to one domain. If there really was a new fundamental law that covered consiousness, then there would be anomalies all over physics. That is not the case, and so it is extremely unlikely that there is a fundamental law waiting to be discovered.
the explanatory gap is a giant anomaly all over physics;of course there are analogies all over physics. Kuhn did not say there's only one anomaly,the point is not an anomaly free paradigm but how many can be absorbed into the paradigm.It is not unthinkable that there will be too many to absorb and paradigm shift will come. The whole EP thing is a paradigm shift.
If you say it's only specific to one domain that means you accept other magisteria. If that's the case then you can't be seeking to explain consciousness by reducing it to brai chemistry.
PX:The more likely scenario is something unexpected within the existing laws.
why? you assuming there are never paradigm shifts? we see them all the time,
PX:I.e., weak emergence.
then you don;t reduce consciousness to brain chemistry?
Joe: Which leaves consciousness completely unaccounted for. Even if such a thing exists how would you know there's no way science could discover it. A big explanatory gap
PX:On the contrary, if such a thing exists, it must follow that science could discover it. It MUST impact on the physical world, because we know consciousness can react to what is in the physical, and can modify the physical.
You are trying to hide the explanatory gap by re-labeling the problem then pending it's not there. We know consciousness exists,no question of that. But you can't explain why it exits. It doesn't fit given the reduction of the hard problem.
Joe: *(1) consciousness exists but you just proved it should not exist. It's un accounted for,k explanatory gap,
PX:I just proved it does not require a new law to explain it. Weak emergence is perfectly consistent with what I am saying.
That's not the same as not reducing to Brain chemistry. There are not two alternatives either it's brain chemistry there's a new law.It could be that the old laws account for it but it doesn't reduce.Now Chalmers believes we need a new law because he thinks consciousness as a basic property is not accounted for by existing physical law. I favor understanding that the explanation of consciousness is not empirical thus is not under scientific domain, existing laws account for an opened approach. That of course would mean scientists have to accept that they are not gods and they are not going to compete with God. We probably need a paradigm shift there. A P shift takes a lot less disription than a new law
PX:Do please explain what you mean by these.
sorry we must bracket that for now as it would take us away from the topic of the post.
This week on my blog (Metacrock)I am discussing the consciousness issue if you want to comment on that. I'll try to explain what I meant here in a post next week.
Joe: That's because the standard procedure of reduction is is to saw off from reality whatever it can't control or explain away by it's reductive methods. Thus they procure hegemony,the problem is it leaves this huge explanatory gap that can't be answered,like the hard problem.
PX:Reductionism is a useful approach to a problem, but science is not restricted to it. And yes, science has gaps.
True but some scientists restrict themselves
PX: A great example would be the intersection of relativity and QM at the Big Bang. Relativity and QM are well established in their domain, but current science cannot fit them together. I guess that is your hegemony. However, we know that whatever unifies them must reduce to relativity in one set of situations and must reduce to QM in another, so we already have some idea of what is missing - and it does not involve consciousness.
I know reductive methods can be useful,that largely depends upon the issues being discussed. Reductionism is Hydra-headed. Reductionism as a method is one thing but there is also a reductionist philosophy that is something else. Just as top down causation allows for bottom up localisation within it, so holism also allows a reductive approach within the larger framework.
Joe: Your paradigm is full of anomalies and it can only work at the price of it's explanatory power which you only pretend it has.
PX:Look around you, Joe. All that technology is a direct result of my paradigm and its ability to explain. It has gaps, but they are at the fringes.
N it's not. Materialism produced nothing. One could do all the science that produced the American way of life,the military industrial complex, and one dimensional man with the Metaphysics of the middle ages, which woodpile not require a sacrifice of any modern science,
ok your move
Is weak emergence consistent with reductionism and holism?
Joe: There are clearly reductionist such as Daniel Dennett who think that consciousness is a side effect of some structure and can be explained away by understanding that structure,I can point to several discussions I've had with atheists where they both accept this view and explain consciousness as "emergent," refitting them is not a straw man because they do say this,they just happen to be wrong. Does Dennette explicit consciousness as emergent? I don't know if so he's wrong,
When you say "consciousness is a side effect of some structure and can be explained away by understanding that structure", that is consistent with weak emergence. I am not sure what your point is beyond that.
Joe: the explanatory gap is a giant anomaly all over physics;of course there are analogies all over physics.
Name six.
Joe: Kuhn did not say there's only one anomaly,the point is not an anomaly free paradigm but how many can be absorbed into the paradigm.It is not unthinkable that there will be too many to absorb and paradigm shift will come. The whole EP thing is a paradigm shift.
Weak emergence is a natural consequence of established laws; does that count as a paradigm shift? I think that is debatable. For strong emergence, seems fair enough - if it exists.
An example of a paradigm shift is relativity. But Newtonian physics is still taught at school, and apparently got man on the moon. It is still good enough in most cases, and the paradigm shift did not result in the old being cast aside (though a paradigm shift did get rid of the luminiferous aether). What we have today is a very good, but not perfect, model. The anomalies are at the fringes, the first instant of the Big Bang for example. It seems likely that we will see a shift when QM and relativity are united, but we will still use both QM and relativity, because we already know they are great models.
Joe: If you say it's only specific to one domain that means you accept other magisteria. If that's the case then you can't be seeking to explain consciousness by reducing it to brai chemistry.
I meant relativity is useful at the large scale, and QM at the small scale. Two different domains.
Joe: why? you assuming there are never paradigm shifts? we see them all the time,
When was the last one?
Joe: then you don;t reduce consciousness to brain chemistry?
I do not think anything else is involved, if that is what you mean.
Joe: You are trying to hide the explanatory gap by re-labeling the problem then pending it's not there. We know consciousness exists,no question of that. But you can't explain why it exits. It doesn't fit given the reduction of the hard problem.
I am talking about a new law in physics, not consciousness. I think we have very good reason to think that consciousness does not require a new law in physics.
Joe: Now Chalmers believes we need a new law because he thinks consciousness as a basic property is not accounted for by existing physical law. I favor understanding that the explanation of consciousness is not empirical thus is not under scientific domain, existing laws account for an opened approach. That of course would mean scientists have to accept that they are not gods and they are not going to compete with God. We probably need a paradigm shift there. A P shift takes a lot less disription than a new law
Again, I think we have good reason to reject claims of a new law. Claiming there will be a paradigm shift without indicating what it is is just mysticism and faith.
Pix
Can you point me to a scientist who rejects weak emeregence, i.e., a philosophical reductionist. I am not aware of any.
Joe: N it's not. Materialism produced nothing.
Of course it did. Just compare to technology (and more specifically, how rapidly it advanced) prior to the enlightenment.
Joe: One could do all the science that produced the American way of life,the military industrial complex, and one dimensional man with the Metaphysics of the middle ages, which woodpile not require a sacrifice of any modern science,
And yet science in the middle ages stumbled blindly in the dark. Ideas such as methodological naturalism and a belief that there was an explanation - and an explanation that did not invoke the supernatural - were vital to get us where we are today. Even Newton, while his contribution was great, spent much of his time in the pursuit of alchemy trying to discover the Philosopher's Stone and with occult interpretations of the Bible.
Pix
Anonymous said...
Joe: I don't think holoism argues that no form of reductive method is right. For example, top down causation does not mean not bottom up causation it does allow for it within the framework of top down.As I said above if weak emergence does;t argue for rededicate mind to brai funtiom then I'm mot arguing about it.
PX:Is weak emergence consistent with reductionism and holism?
Reductionism and holism are enemies. Holism allows for some reductionist methods but as a philosophy the two are opposed.
Joe: There are clearly reductionist such as Daniel Dennett who think that consciousness is a side effect of some structure and can be explained away by understanding that structure,I can point to several discussions I've had with atheists where they both accept this view and explain consciousness as "emergent," refitting them is not a straw man because they do say this,they just happen to be wrong. Does Dennette explicit consciousness as emergent? I don't know if so he's wrong,
PX:When you say "consciousness is a side effect of some structure and can be explained away by understanding that structure", that is consistent with weak emergence. I am not sure what your point is beyond that.
No I think you are being unclear. Weak emergence does not say consciousnesses is reduce ale,did you actually read anything I wrote? Strong are weak is defined by were the property emerges from i relation to the level at which it appears, it has nothing to do with the particular property that is said to emerge.
Joe: the explanatory gap is a giant anomaly all over physics;of course there are analogies all over physics.
PX:Name six.
I am beginning to think you don't know what anomalies are. if you don't know the works of Kuhn just say so,no shame. A paradigm kids a model. Models change all the time, they change when they can no longer be absorbed into the paradigm. That is contradictions to teh model. Baht implies that there are going to be a lot of anomalies before paradigm shift occurs.
Joe: Kuhn did not say there's only one anomaly,the point is not an anomaly free paradigm but how many can be absorbed into the paradigm.It is not unthinkable that there will be too many to absorb and paradigm shift will come. The whole EP thing is a paradigm shift.
PX:Weak emergence is a natural consequence of established laws; does that count as a paradigm shift? I think that is debatable. For strong emergence, seems fair enough - if it exists.
A Paradigm is a model. Example, the idea that the universe or cosmos is like a gait mechanism, a mechanical system,is a model. Thus, a paradigm.The thinking has shifted to think of the cosmos is as an organism. That's a paradigm shift.What anomalies led to the shift? The realization that mechanical mechanism are made profusely the cosmos is unplanned like an organism.
more latter toay
I'm not real sure what you are trying to argue
Joe: If you say it's only specific to one domain that means you accept other magisteria. If that's the case then you can't be seeking to explain consciousness by reducing it to brai chemistry.
I meant relativity is useful at the large scale, and QM at the small scale. Two different domains.
I 'm not sure those are different domains. Domains are academic disciplines not environment. Theology and philosophy are domains.
Joe: why? you assuming there are never paradigm shifts? we see them all the time,
PX:When was the last one?
I gave an example above. Another example, Multiverse might be considered one
Joe: then you don;t reduce consciousness to brain chemistry?
PX:I do not think anything else is involved, if that is what you mean.
Not what I mean. You could think consciousness is caused by brain chemistry without thinking that consciousness is epi-phenomenal.Not that epi-phenomenality is the only form of reduction. Bit just to use one example.
Joe: You are trying to hide the explanatory gap by re-labeling the problem then pending it's not there. We know consciousness exists,no question of that. But you can't explain why it exits. It doesn't fit given the reduction of the hard problem.
I am talking about a new law in physics, not consciousness. I think we have very good reason to think that consciousness does not require a new law in physics.
Then you are wailing on a straw man argument because I already dealt with that above. That is not what the Brain/mind thing is about.
Joe: Now Chalmers believes we need a new law because he thinks consciousness as a basic property is not accounted for by existing physical law. I favor understanding that the explanation of consciousness is not empirical thus is not under scientific domain, existing laws account for an opened approach. That of course would mean scientists have to accept that they are not gods and they are not going to compete with God. We probably need a paradigm shift there. A P shift takes a lot less disription than a new law
PX:Again, I think we have good reason to reject claims of a new law. Claiming there will be a paradigm shift without indicating what it is is just mysticism and faith.
Please read Kuhn before trying to talk about it,The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.
Joe: I know reductive methods can be useful,that largely depends upon the issues being discussed. Reductionism is Hydra-headed. Reductionism as a method is one thing but there is also a reductionist philosophy that is something else. Just as top down causation allows for bottom up localisation within it, so holism also allows a reductive approach within the larger framework.
PXCan you point me to a scientist who rejects weak emeregence, i.e., a philosophical reductionist. I am not aware of any.
Have you been going through this whole discussion with the misapprehension that I am opposed to emergence? I am a hoalist,so I am an emergentist. Emergence is part of holism.my point is that emergence contradicts reductionist if we take reduction the braod hiloshical sense.
Joe: No it's not. Materialism produced nothing.
PXOf course it did. Just compare to technology (and more specifically, how rapidly it advanced) prior to the enlightenment.
That's mistake coloration for causality, most of the great discoverers of science prior to French revolution were made by Christians thus they were not materialists. That continued to be so through the 19th century. There are still more God believers in science than atheists. No great scientific discoveries are said by historians of science to have been made due to materialism. some were made by materialists but not because they were materialists.
Joe: One could do all the science that produced the American way of life,the military industrial complex, and one dimensional man with the Metaphysics of the middle ages, which would not require a sacrifice of any modern science.
And yet science in the middle ages stumbled blindly in the dark. Ideas such as methodological naturalism and a belief that there was an explanation - and an explanation that did not invoke the supernatural -
(1) Methodological naturalism is not metaphysical naturalism. A devout Christian can do science as a methodological naturalist and not contradict her faith.
(2)Science in they middle ages did not stumble blindly. They actually made quite a bit of progress,I suggest you read Hyden White;s famous article on the roots of the eccololgical crisis in the middle ages.
were vital to get us where we are today. Even Newton, while his contribution was great, spent much of his time in the pursuit of alchemy trying to discover the Philosopher's Stone and with occult interpretations of the Bible.
Trail and error is not failure it's as much a lean rig process as following the experiment step by step. Now you are motivation the realm not just logical extension from first priceless. In that realm I showed belief in God is not a setback,now you think to take the battle to realm of motivation but we find Newton's motivation and Boyle's were rooted in their belief in God,
(1) I am pro emergence maybe even strong emergence would not bother me,
(2) anti reductionist as a philosophy but,
(3)no problem with reduction as a methodology in some respects.
Then I doubt any scientists holds to philosophical reductionism.
Joe: No I think you are being unclear. Weak emergence does not say consciousnesses is reduce ale,did you actually read anything I wrote? Strong are weak is defined by were the property emerges from i relation to the level at which it appears, it has nothing to do with the particular property that is said to emerge.
I did not understand what you mean by reductionism. Better to say weak emergence says consciousness supervenes on brain chemistry, I guess.
Joe: I am beginning to think you don't know what anomalies are. if you don't know the works of Kuhn just say so,no shame. A paradigm kids a model. Models change all the time, they change when they can no longer be absorbed into the paradigm. That is contradictions to teh model. Baht implies that there are going to be a lot of anomalies before paradigm shift occurs.
I am wondering if you know what anomalies are, given you cannot name six, when there are apparently so many.
Joe: A Paradigm is a model. Example, the idea that the universe or cosmos is like a gait mechanism, a mechanical system,is a model. Thus, a paradigm.The thinking has shifted to think of the cosmos is as an organism. That's a paradigm shift.What anomalies led to the shift? The realization that mechanical mechanism are made profusely the cosmos is unplanned like an organism.
Sure. The classic example is the anomalous orbit of Mercury, leading to the relativity paradigm shift. But this is why it is important to establish what the current anomalies are.
If consciousness is weak emergence, then no paradigm shift is required; the currently laws are good enough.
The decider is what happens in a computer model. If we can model the brain sufficiently well, will consciousness appear in the model? If so, the model is good enough, no need for a paradigm shift.
Joe: I gave an example above. Another example, Multiverse might be considered one
The example above I take to be the universe as an organism. I really do not think you can claim such a fringe idea was a paradigm shift. The multiverse might be one day, but again has yet to be mainstream.
My point here is that paradigm shifts are pretty rare events. The best examples, relativity, QM and evolution, were a long time ago (the most recent example for natural sciences on the Wiki page is 1919). The reason for that, I suggest, is that the big anomalies have now been resolved. There really are not many left, and those that are are right at the fringes.
Pix: I am talking about a new law in physics, not consciousness. I think we have very good reason to think that consciousness does not require a new law in physics.
Joe: Then you are wailing on a straw man argument because I already dealt with that above. That is not what the Brain/mind thing is about.
May be I misunderstood. I was going on this:
"First of all, Nagel doesn't say anything about the consciousness dimension being opposed to the laws of physics. Neither do I. Who says there is not a conscious dimension to the laws of physics that we don't know about?"
"All he is really saying is that there's a dimension that we don't know much about and until we start including it in our explanations, our explanations lack something in explanatory power."
Joe: Please read Kuhn before trying to talk about it,The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.
I was kind of hoping you would be able to present your own argument.
Pix
Joe: Have you been going through this whole discussion with the misapprehension that I am opposed to emergence? I am a hoalist,so I am an emergentist. Emergence is part of holism.my point is that emergence contradicts reductionist if we take reduction the braod hiloshical sense.
I have no idea how your comment relates to what I said. I understand you to be advocating strong emergence for consciousness.
My point is that the reductionism you talk about is a straw man. No real scientist rejects emergence; it is too well established.
Joe: That's mistake coloration for causality, most of the great discoverers of science prior to French revolution were made by Christians thus they were not materialists. That continued to be so through the 19th century. There are still more God believers in science than atheists. No great scientific discoveries are said by historians of science to have been made due to materialism. some were made by materialists but not because they were materialists.
Actually Muslims did a lot of early science, though again not materialists.
However, the point is that good science requires methodological naturalism, which implies looking for a non-supernatural cause. Of course, Christians can do that too.
Joe: (1) Methodological naturalism is not metaphysical naturalism. A devout Christian can do science as a methodological naturalist and not contradict her faith.
You did not specific metaphysical naturalism.
Joe: Trail and error is not failure it's as much a lean rig process as following the experiment step by step. Now you are motivation the realm not just logical extension from first priceless. In that realm I showed belief in God is not a setback,now you think to take the battle to realm of motivation but we find Newton's motivation and Boyle's were rooted in their belief in God,
But Newton wasted so much effort in the pursuit of the supernatural, something no modern scientists (theist or not) would do, because methodological naturalism is so well established.
Pix
Methodological naturalism and SN are not at odds. As for the idea that Newton wasted time with such things I it just look at it as recreation. It's what he needed to refresh himself.