CADRE Comments

[Introductory note from Jason Pratt: the previous entry in this series of posts can be found here. The first entry can be found here. This entry concludes a fourth chapter, begun here. I highly recommend reading at least as far back as this, first.] But some people (believer and sceptic alike) will still have problems with the concept that anything definite may be discovered about the Ultimate Reality. To the sceptics, especially the atheists who are philosophical naturalists, I reply that we discover apparent truths about Nature and its operations and character all the time, and use (sometimes incorrectly, but sometimes correctly, too) such information all the time. This is despite the fact that if non-sentient Nature is the foundation of all reality, then it must be as impossible for derivative human reasoning to fully understand it, as for us to fully understand a sentient ultimate Fact. For that matter, it seems clear from the science of quantum mechanics that whatever Nature ...

[Introductory note from Jason Pratt: the previous entry in this series of posts can be found here. The first entry can be found here. This entry continues a fourth chapter, begun here. I highly recommend reading at least as far back as this, first.] It seems to me (as an initial expectation, based on my previous considerations), that every 'real' belief requires an acted inference of some sort on the part of the believer; although the exact inference may not be what the believer claims it is with respect to the belief. In other words, I question whether there can be any such thing as a real belief that is irrational (in the very limited sense I am using of ‘irrational’.) As I roll on the ground in delirium after being snakebit, I might be muttering "Snake... in hole..." But that doesn't necessarily mean I actually 'believe' it: because I might not be conscious. The sounds coming out of my mouth might be the same type of non-intended effects-by-associa...

[Introductory note from Jason Pratt: the previous entry in this series of posts can be found here. The first entry can be found here. This entry continues a fourth chapter, begun here. I highly recommend reading at least as far back as this, first.] If my brother, Spencer, thinks he has good grounds for believing that my belief of a snake in the hole has been fostered purely from a cocaine-fit, then he would not (or at least should not) be embarrassed to discover there was, after all, a snake in the hole. He had no good reason to believe the snake was there. Furthermore, my argument that he (and I) should stay away from the hole was ultimately untrustworthy. The form of the argument that we should stay away from the hole was not itself invalid; but without the anchor of rationality at the beginning, there was no good reason to pay attention either to my initial belief ("a snake is in the hole") or to my consequent inferred belief ("we should stay away from the hol...

[Introductory note from Jason Pratt: the previous entry in this series of posts can be found here. The first entry can be found here. ] Having explained why, as a Christian, I do not hold to what many people (Christian and sceptic) have considered the 'party line' that reason and faith are mutually exclusive, I will now explore this issue from a deeper philosophical perspective. A Christian (or other religious theist) who accepts a faith/reason disparity will usually do so for religious reasons. His argument that these two aspects must be mutually exclusive (or at least need not have anything to do with each other) will be grounded on positions and presumptions which usually proceed from a devout loyalty to God's status, or from authority of specifically religious leaders, or from the structure of religious ritual, or some combination thereof. And a sceptic who accepts a faith/reason disparity might do so only because, as far as he can tell, his opposition has chosen that ...